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AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF SINGLE-TIER
VERSUS TWO-TIER PARTNERSHIPS IN THE
AM LAW 200
WILLIAM D. HENDERSON*
During the last decade, many of the nation's largest law firms have
converted from single-tier to two-tier (or multi-tier) partnerships. A
two-tier firm contains separate tracks for "equity" and "nonequity"
partners; the equity tier typically controls the firm and enjoys a
larger per capita share of the firm's profits. At present, two-tier
partnerships make up 79% of the Am Law 200. The conventional
explanation for the growth of the two-tier system (or, conversely,
the abandonment of the single-tier) is that it produces higher profits
per equity partner ("PPP"), thus solidifying the prestige of the law
firm and improving its ability to attract the best legal talent.
Drawing upon a comprehensive dataset of Am Law 200 firms, this
study documents that average PPP are significantly higher in single-
tier firms, even after controlling for geographic market segment and
firm leverage. The higher profitability of single-tier firms appears
to be a function of higher levels of prestige, which enable single-tier
firms to (a) attract and retain a more lucrative client base, and (b)
run a more rigorous promotion-to-partnership tournament in which
associates work longer hours and are less secure in their futures
with the firm.
* Associate Professor, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington. B.A.,
Case Western Reserve University; J.D., University of Chicago. I would like to thank
Bruce MacEwen, author of the Adam Smith, Esq., blog on law firm economics, for
countless hours of dialogue on the Am Law 200 marketplace, and Bruce McLean (Akin
Gump) and Larry Lederman (Milbank Tweed) for helping me understand the nuances of
competition among large law firms and elite lawyers. My methodology and analysis
benefited from the IU Law Junior Faculty Workshop, an online workshop hosted by
Conglomerate.com, and the Washington, D.C. chapter of the IU Law Society. I also
received valuable comments from Scott Baker, Greg Castanias, Daniel Fisher, Michael
Guttentag, Robert Hillman, Christine Hurt, Kate Litvak, Karl Lutz, Andrew Morriss,
Larry Ribstein, Richard Sander, Jeff Stake, David Van Zandt, David Wilkins, and Joshua
Wright. Finally, I want to acknowledge the excellent research assistance of Catherine
Matthews, Elizabeth Morgan, Jessica Regan, and Elizabeth Wysong. I am solely
responsible for all remaining errors.
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Based upon a ten-year longitudinal sample, this study also finds
modest statistical evidence that the two-tier structure, after
controlling for relative starting position and geographic market, is
associated with larger gains in PPP. In light of its uncertain
financial benefits, the author theorizes that the two-tier structure is
primarily a bonding mechanism used by less prestigious firms to
institutionalize a marginal product method of partnership
compensation and consolidate managerial control for the benefit of
the firm's most powerful partners. Failure to switch to the two-tier
structure leaves the firm vulnerable to defections and possible
collapse. As a result, the primary economic benefit of the two-tier
format may be firm stability rather than higher average PPP.
Finally, this study provides some evidence that the appeal of
permanent nonequity partnership status, which typically would
entail fewer business development demands, may set in motion an
adverse selection problem at the associate recruitment level, thus
undermining some of the perceived benefits of a two-tier (or multi-
tier) format.
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INTRODUCTION
During the last thirty years, the typical size of "large" corporate
law firms has grown dramatically.' During the 1960s, a law firm with
seventy-five lawyers was considered large. Only a handful of law
firms had more than 100 attorneys. Yet according to data published
in 2004 by The American Lawyer, the average size (based on gross
revenues) of the nation's 200 largest law firms ("Am Law 200") is
now 466 attorneys.2 In 2003, more than 93,000 lawyers worked as
partners, associates, of counsel, or staff attorneys in Am Law 200
firms.3 With average revenues of $272 million,4 the typical Am Law
200 law firm is comparable in size to companies listed on the
NASDAQ or the New York Stock Exchange. However, because
every state in the nation has ethics rules that proscribe nonlawyer
investment in law firms,5 Am Law 200 law firms remain privately held
businesses owned by the same partners who generate a substantial
proportion of the firm's annual revenues.6
In theory, the unity of ownership and management should
eliminate the substantial agency problems that plague the modern
1. See generally MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF
LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM (1991) (observing that the
rate of growth increased exponentially in the early 1970s).
2. Author's calculations based on data published in the July and August 2004 issues
of The American Lawyer.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4(a) (2004) ("A lawyer or law
firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer except [under several enumerated, narrow
exceptions]."); see also Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, Law Firms on the Big
Board?: A Proposal for Nonlawyer Investment in Law Firms, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1998)
(noting that every state in the nation has adopted some rule against nonlawyer investment
in law firms); Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm Structure, 84
VA. L. REV. 1707, 1721-25 (1998) (discussing and critiquing the ban and theorizing that
the prevalence of the promotion-to-partnership system can be partially explained by the
liquidity constraints imposed by the ban). The District of Columbia recently amended its
ethical rules to permit nonlawyers to be partners in law firms. See D.C. BAR ASS'N,
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4(b) & cmt. 7 (2005) (specifying instances where a
lawyer and nonlawyer can share a financial stake in a law partnership, including
arrangements where a "nonlawyer lobbyist... [works] with lawyers who perform
legislative services").
6. Some Am Law 200 firms are organized as professional corporations ("P.C.").
However, for our present purposes, a "shareholder" in a professional corporation is
functionally equivalent to a "partner" in a general or limited liability partnership.
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publicly held corporation.7  Yet if Am Law 200 partners, like
corporate shareholders, want to maximize the value of their
investment, it remains an open question which type of law firm
structure-i.e., system of incentives for associates and partners-
produces the best return for the firm on a per-partner basis.
During the 1980s, many large law firms and law firm consultants
began focusing on two-tier partnerships as a method of improving law
firm profitability.8 The microeconomic logic was straightforward:
Single-tier firms, in which partners share profits (often according to a
predetermined schedule of lockstep compensation),9  provide
deleterious cross-subsidies between productive and nonproductive
partners. Once admitted to the partnership, a lawyer in a single-tier
law firm has little incentive not to shirk. And even if profit shares are
allocated-in whole or in part-on the basis of hours billed, some
partners can free-ride off the business development talents of others.
Because the most valuable partners in a single-tier firm lack the
necessary voting power to effect a compensation system that reflects
their contribution to the firm, their only recourse was to leave (or
threaten to leave) the firm. 10
In contrast, the two-tier structure purportedly solved these
incentive problems by installing rainmakers as equity partners and
placing talented legal technicians and specialists in a nonequity tier.
Because of the highly selective partnership criteria, it was presumed
that equity partners would earn higher incomes in two-tier firms, thus
solidifying the firm's prestige and enhancing the firm's ability to
7. The agency costs in large, publicly held corporations arise from the fact that
corporate managers, in the face of a widely dispersed ownership (i.e., shareholders), are
able to pursue management and investment policies that further their own personal
interests rather than those of the corporation. Therefore, the extent of these agency costs
is largely a function of the ability and willingness of shareholders to overcome the
collective action problem. Monitoring a corporate manager, after all, is a public good.
This problem was originally framed by Berle and Means and formally theorized by Jensen
and Meckling. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932); Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Agency Costs and the Theory of the Firm, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
8. For example, the interest in two-tier partnerships in the 1980s resulted in the
ABA commissioning a detailed monograph on the subject. See BRUCE D. HEINTZ &
NANCY MARKHAM-BUGBEE, AM. BAR ASS'N, Two-TIER PARTNERSHIPS AND OTHER
ALTERNATIVES: FIVE APPOACHES 1986.
9. See, e.g., ALTMAN & WElL, INC., AM. BAR ASS'N, COMPENSATION PLANS FOR
LAWYERS AND THEIR STAFFS: SALARIES, BONUSES AND PROFIT-SHARING 16 (1986)
(asserting that a lock-step system "is totally lacking in accountability" and "favors the least
energetic, least aggressive, and least capable," thus permitting "some partners [to] 'retire'
at their desks long before retirement age, yet ... continue to receive a full share").
10. See infra Part I.D.
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attract the best legal talent. The two-tier structure could also be
utilized to soften the traditional "up or out" rule for talented
associates who were not partnership material but nonetheless added
value to the firm. With all these advantages, it was presumed that
two-tier partnerships would be more profitable for equity partners
and less prone to defections that could destabilize the firm.1
The powerful economic logic behind two-tier partnerships
arguably accounts for its widespread adoption among large corporate
law firms. Since 1994, when The American Lawyer first began
tracking single-tier versus two-tier law firm status, 2 the number of
two-tier firms in the Am Law 100 has expanded from forty-four (in
1994) to seventy-seven (in 2003). 13 Of the eighty-nine law firms that
appeared on the rankings in both years, twenty-five of forty-nine
single-tier firms (51%) switched to the two-tier format by 2003."4
Similarly, among the fifty-nine single-tier firms that appeared on the
Am Law 200 in both 1999 and 2004,11 twenty-two (36%) switched to
the two-tier format during the five-year observation period. 6 At
present, 158 Am Law 200 law firms (79%) have a nonequity
partnership tier.17 Further, within this elite cohort, the proportion of
nonequity partners is increasing approximately three times faster than
the proportion of equity partners.
8
With a massive migration toward the two-tier structure, the
logical inference is that this partnership model, all else equal, offers
superior profitability for the lawyers who own and control the firm-
the equity partners. 9 However, a careful examination of the Am Law
11. See infra Part I.D.
12. Under the definition utilized by The American Lawyer, a two-tier partnership has
a class of lawyers whose income is not primarily determined by the firm's profits. A
shorthand for a two-tier partnership is whether less than 100% of the partners receive a
Schedule K-1 for tax purposes. See Alison Frankel, Am Law 100: Veil of Tiers, AM.
LAW., July 2004, at 92, 93.
13. Author's calculations based on data published in the July 1995 and July 2004
issues of The American Lawyer.
14. Id.
15. In 1999, The American Lawyer expanded its rankings (based on gross firm
revenues) from the top 100 to the top 200. Since that time, the Am Law 100 has been
reported in the magazine's July issue and the Am Law 101 to 200 has appeared in the
August issue.
16. Author's calculations based on data published in the July and August 1999 and
the July and August 2004 issues of The American Lawyer.
17. Id.
18. Frankel, supra note 12, at 92.
19. Among law firms in the Am Law 200, PPP has emerged as the primary measure of
a firm's relative performance. See, e.g., Brenda Sandburg, The New Math, RECORDER,
Apr. 27, 2004, at 1 (noting that "per-partner profits--or PPP-still stand as a sort of
shorthand for a law firm's status"). PPP is defined as the firm's net income divided by the
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200 marketplace suggests a much more complex and nuanced story.
Drawing upon a comprehensive dataset assembled from a variety of
published sources, this study presents five significant findings on
single-tier versus two-tier partnerships:
(1) Profitability. After controlling for market segment (as
defined by the percentage of lawyers working in New York City and
major global cities), 20  single-tier partnerships appear to be
significantly more profitable than two-tier partnerships.21
(2) Leverage. The higher level of profitability of single-tier
partnerships cannot be explained by higher leverage.22 In the four
market segments analyzed in this study, single-tier partnerships have,
on average, lower leverage than two-tier partnerships.23
(3) Prestige. The higher profitability of single-tier firms appears
to be a function, at least in part, of their superior reputation among
high-end corporate lawyers.24 In a multivariate regression model that
controlled for market segment and leverage, law firm prestige is a
highly significant predictor of law firm profitability. Further, in a
logistic regression model, it appears that highly prestigious law firms
are much more likely to utilize the single-tier structure, even after
controlling for firm size, profitability, and market segment.25
(4) Partnership Tournament. The two-tier structure appears to
give rise to a less rigorous "promotion-to-partnership tournament, 2 6
number of equity partners within the firm. See Frankel, supra note 12, at 92-93 (noting
that The American Lawyer defines an equity partner as a partner who receives more than
half of his or her compensation from firm profits or receives a Schedule K-1 for tax
purposes).
20. I defined market segment according to the proportion of lawyers working in New
York and various global cities because this definition consistently produced the strongest
correlation with PPP. See infra Part II.B.2.
21. See infra Part III.A.
22. This study uses the same definition of leverage as The American Lawyer. See, e.g.,
Guide to Our Methodology, AM. LAW., July 2005, at 109 (defining leverage as "the ratio of
all lawyers to equity partners"); Leverage Leaders, AM. LAW., July 2004, at 93 (defining
leverage as "the number of equity partners divided by the firm's total head count"). For
an in-depth discussion of why this study employs this definition, see infra Part II.B.3.
23. See infra Table 6 and accompanying text.
24. The importance of examining a demand-side explanation was originally suggested
to me by Professor David Wilkins. Without controlling for prestige, which presumably
generates higher and more inelastic demand for a firm's services, a researcher might
incorrectly conclude that the single-tier structure (which highly correlates with prestige) is
a primary determinant of law firm profitability. I am greatly indebted to Professor
Wilkins for this insight.
25. See infra Parts III.A-B.
26. The promotion-to-partnership tournament is a concept originally popularized by
Professors Galanter and Palay in their famous 1991 study, Tournament of Lawyers. See
GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 1, at 100-02.
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which could undermine firm profitability. Associates in single-tier
firms bill, on average, 1.8 hours more per week than their two-tier
counterparts and are less likely to perceive a long-term future with
the firm. 7 These differences are corroborated by regression results
that suggest that (a) leverage is associated with a larger positive profit
gain in single-tier firms, and (b) lower attrition is associated with a
significant negative effect on profits per partner ("PPP") in two-tier
firms.2 s
(5) Strategy. Based on a ten-year (Am Law 100) longitudinal
sample, and controlling for market segment and relative starting
position, there is modest statistical evidence that switching to the two-
tier format is associated with higher PPP. The expansion of the
nonequity track relative to the equity tier is also associated with a
slight increase in profitability. The ability to exploit this relationship,
however, may be a function of prestige.29
Drawing upon these results, this study suggests a relatively
simple theory of law firm structure. Specifically, the two-tier
partnership structure appears to operate primarily as a competitive
strategy utilized by less prestigious law firms that lack a significant
base of large, price-insensitive clients. In an environment in which
corporate clients are increasingly loyal to individual lawyers rather
than firms, rainmaking partners with "portable" business must be
compensated at or near their marginal product. Within this market
space, a single-tier structure is likely to be too inflexible to apportion
profits and management decisions among a single class of partners
with widely differing economic contributions to the firm. Hence, in
order to retain its most valuable partners, a law firm effectively bonds
itself to a marginal product approach by adopting a two-tier or multi-
tier structure, ° which serves to consolidate power in the equity tier.
The uneven financial performance of firms that switch to the two-tier
format suggests that the primary economic benefit may be firm
stability (or survival) rather than higher average profits for the
majority of equity partners.
In contrast, single-tier firms in the Am Law 200 generally have
higher levels of firm-specific capital,3 which confers significant
benefits in terms of client demand and associate recruitment. As a
result, partners at highly profitable single-tier firms lack the incentive,
27. See infra Table 11 and accompanying text.
28. See infra Part III.C.
29. See infra Part I1D.
30. For a discussion of the marginal product approach, see infra Part I.A.
31. For a discussion of firm-specific capital, see infra Part I.A.
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and possibly the ability, to grab their full marginal product by leaving
(or threatening to leave) the firm. Further, the high profits and client
loyalty of this sharing model can reinforce beneficial intra-firm
incentives for efficient, high quality legal work that further solidifies a
firm's reputation.32 The upshot is that the financial benefits of tier-
structure, including the type and degree of leverage a firm can
employ,33 vary according to a firm's relative position in the
marketplace for high-end corporate legal services.
This study is organized in four parts. Part I reviews the academic
and law firm consulting literature on law firm structures to highlight
useful conceptual differences between single-tier and two-tier law
firms. Part II summarizes the dataset and outlines the theoretical
significance of the study's principal independent variables. Part III
presents four sets of findings: (1) differences between single-tier
versus two-tier firms on the dimensions of profitability, leverage and
prestige; (2) logistic regression results showing that firm prestige is
the single best predictor of tier structure; (3) linear regression results
demonstrating that determinants of profitability, including the
promotion to partnership tournament, are significantly different in
single-tier versus two-tier firms; and (4) linear regression results
suggesting a modest statistical relationship between tier structure and
growth in law firm profits. Finally, drawing upon these results, Part
IV presents a unified theory of single-tier versus two-tier firms and
discusses the implications and limitations of this study, including an
important caveat on the heterogeneous nature of two-tier
partnerships.
32. For a discussion of the sharing model, see infra Part I.A.
33. A firm can increase leverage by either increasing the firm's proportion of
associates, nonequity partners, or both. Cf. Peter Giuliani, How and Why To Create a
Two-Tier Partnership, AM. LAW., May 1990, at 28 (law firm consultant noting that "the
best compensation system for second-tier partners will enable the firm to retain the
advantages of leverage but also reward exceptional individual performance" (emphasis
added)). However, a less prestigious firm may have to rely disproportionately on
nonequity partners because it will be unable to recruit high quality associates if it attempts
to run a highly leveraged up-or-out tournament. Fairly liberal promotions to nonequity
partner, although relatively expensive, may be an important recruitment and retention
tool. But see Robert Dolinko, A Comment on Professor Henderson's Empirical Study of
Single-Tier Versus Two-Tier Partnerships in the Am Law 200, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1753, 1754
(2006) (arguing that the expansion of a nonequity tier is driven by a mixture of economic
and noneconomic factors and suggesting that partner-associate ratio is a more telling
measure of leverage). For an in-depth discussion of leverage and how it is defined for the
purposes of this study, see infra Part II.B.3.
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I. LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature on law firm partnership structure includes both
academic articles and trade publications authored primarily by law
firm consultants. Both genres are useful for constructing a conceptual
framework of single-tier versus two-tier law firms. Part I has four
sections. Section A reviews the important theoretical work of Gilson
and Mnookin.34 Section B summarizes the findings (and limitations)
of Samuelson's and Jaffe's empirical work on law firm profitability."
Section C provides historical background of the rise of the two-tier
model, including terminology commonly used by law firm consultants
and managing partners. Finally, Section D discusses the intended,
and the potentially unintended, incentives created by a two-tier
system.
A. Gilson and Mnookin
In a well-known 1985 article in the Stanford Law Review,
Professor Gilson and Professor Mnookin utilized portfolio theory to
argue that the large law firm was primarily a device for capturing the
economic benefits of legal specialization while diversifying away the
concomitant risks.36  Specifically, a lawyer can render more
sophisticated and efficient (and hence more lucrative) legal services if
she develops a narrow practice area. But the higher expected payoff
of specialization also exposes the lawyer's income to fluctuations in
the business cycle. Gilson and Mnookin argue that the large general
service law firm provides an optimal solution because it facilitates
several intra-firm practice areas with offsetting peaks and valleys,
such as securities and bankruptcy law.37
34. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Coming of Age in a Corporate Law
Firm: The Economics of Associate Career Patterns, 41 STAN. L. REV. 567, 567-68 (1989)
[hereinafter Associate Career Patterns] (using economic theory to explain variations in the
traditional "up or out" partnership decisions among various large corporate law firms);
Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: An
Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN.
L. REV. 313 (1985) [hereinafter Profit Sharing] (outlining a theory of profit sharing among
partners in corporate law firms).
35. See S.S. Samuelson & L. J. Jaffe, A Statistical Analysis of Law Firm Profitability,
70 B.U. L. REV. 185 (1990) [hereinafter Law Firm Profitability]. The results of this study
are also reported in Chapter 7 of Professor Samuelson's treatise on law firm management.
See Susan S. Samuelson & L. J. Jaffe, Success and Failure [hereinafter Success and
Failure], in LAW FIRM MANAGEMENT: A BUSINESS APPROACH § 7 (Susan S. Samuelson
ed., 1994) [hereinafter LAW FIRM MANAGEMENT].
36. See Profit Sharing, supra note 34, at 327-29.
37. Id. (providing example of how a securities specialist and a bankruptcy specialist
can diversify away risks in the business cycle). But see ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS
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However, as Gilson and Mnookin acknowledge, the lynchpin of
this diversification-of-risk model is the partners' agreement ex ante to
share profits with one another in good times and in bad. Drawing
upon economic agency theory, Gilson and Mnookin caution that the
potentially large gains from cooperation can be thwarted by three
types of opportunistic behavior: (1) partners "shirking" their duty to
be a fully productive member of the firm; (2) partners "grabbing" a
higher percentage of firm profits by threatening to depart; and (3)
partners "leaving" the firm with their clients and business in tow. 38
According to Gilson and Mnookin, the division of law firm
profits falls on a continuum between a "sharing model" based on
partner seniority and a "marginal product model" based on each
partner's individual contribution.39 Although Gilson and Mnookin do
not explicitly address the formal structure of law firm partnerships,
the economic principles of each model essentially track the division
between single-tier and two-tier firms. For example, the authors cited
three well-known law firms-Cravath, Swaine & Moore; Covington &
Burling; and Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering-as examples of the sharing
model because each "remained committed to essentially 'lockstep,'
seniority based compensation systems."4 Realistically, this type of
sharing model can only exist in a single-tier law firm; and, not
surprisingly, all three firms are (and have been) categorized in the
annual American Lawyer ranking as single-tier partnerships.4 In
contrast, the adoption of the two-tier structure clearly signals to
lawyers within the firm that there are criteria beyond a partner's
tenure with the firm (e.g., development and control of lucrative
clients) that will be relied upon to allocate profits. 2
WITH POWER: SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAW FIRM 64-65 (1988)
(noting that extensive interviews with dozens of partners at four large Chicago firms failed
to provide any significant support for Gilson and Mnookin's theory that firms had grown
to diversify away risks associated with specialization).
38. See Profit Sharing, supra note 34, at 321, 335-39.
39. Id. at 321, 348-49, 352-53, 356.
40. Id. at 341. Note that Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering recently merged with another
large firm. See Lily Henning, Wilmer Cutler, Hale & Dorr To Merge, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 20, 2004, at 4. It currently operates as WilmerHale.
41. The tier structure is reported each year in table format in the magazine's annual
rankings issues. See supra note 15.
42. Cf HEINTZ & MARKHAM-BUGBEE, supra note 8, at 5 tbl.2, 25, 50-55 (law firm
consultants summarizing five approaches to two-tier partnerships with four of them
requiring equity status for partner participation, and the fifth requiring the firm to scuttle
profit division principles based on seniority in favor of "income levels consistent with
[each partner's] level of contribution").
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The parallels between the sharing versus marginal product
models and the single-tier versus two-tier structure are also evident in
Gilson's and Mnookin's observations of the traditional "up or out"
approach to partnership. The authors note that "[t]he values of a
sharing model may not allow for a second class of law firm citizen,""
whereas "a productivity model, which necessarily contemplates a
number of classes of citizens, should find the phenomenon [of
retaining associates who are not qualified for partnership] less
troublesome."'
In evaluating both the sharing and marginal product models,
Gilson and Mnookin acknowledge that the sharing approach can
deaden incentives and lead to the problem of shirking.45 Yet, the
authors argue convincingly that the marginal product model, because
it cannot precisely quantify all dimensions of a lawyer's contribution
to the firm, also opens the door for perverse incentives that can
undercut a firm's efficiency, service quality, and profitability. For
example, if a partner's compensation is pegged to the amount of work
her clients provide the firm, he or she may thwart interactions
between the client and other partners in the firm-even those with
valuable specialized knowledge-in order to block any potential
intrusion on his or her business origination credits.46 Similarly,
43. See Profit Sharing, supra note 34, at 379.
44. Id. at 379 n.113. The authors go on to observe that the increasing interest in the
productivity model "should lead to renewed interest in the idea of permanent associates,"
and if the title of partner has any importance independent of profit sharing, "it would be
foolish not to call them partners and simply continue to pay them less." Id.
45. Id. at 340 & n.46 (citing sources reflecting "a growing consensus among
consultants and academics that sharing-oriented systems are the worst, and that a
partner's share should depend primarily upon his productivity"); cf. Berne Rolston,
Improving Techniques of Partner Selection and Compensation, LEG. ECON., Jan.-Feb.
1988, at 38, 40 ("The day of the 'retired partner in place at age 40' ... is gone .... Every
,owner' therefore must be compensated.., to a greater extent in proportion to his or her
contribution to the business.").
46. See Profit Sharing, supra note 34, 350-51. A recent article on the law firm of
Patton Boggs, which permits partners to negotiate internally over origination credits,
offers some insight into how such a system affects internal firm relations and ultimately
client service. See Jason McLure, Beyond Boggs, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 26, 2005, at 1
(noting that "[f]ormer partners at Patton Boggs say that the system can push lawyers into
making skewed decisions, such as choosing a younger partner with less leverage to
negotiate for attribution share.., or avoiding giving high-level work to other partners at
all" and quoting the firm's managing partner that "[o]ur system allows people to do the
wrong thing"); see also Edward A. Bernstein, Structural Conflicts of Interest: How a Law
Firm's Compensation System Affects Its Ability To Serve Clients, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV.
1261, 1274 (arguing that these incentives are so "powerful and ubiquitous" in firms that
utilize an "eat what you kill" compensation system that the ABA ethical rules should be
amended to "require[ ] that all law firms disclose their partner compensation systems to
clients as a matter of course").
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notwithstanding who originated the business, the lawyers who
actually perform the work may engender considerable client trust and
loyalty. If this contribution is not properly rewarded at its marginal
product, the firm is once again vulnerable to grabbing and leaving.47
Gilson and Mnookin ultimately conclude that the sharing model
can, in theory, be "more productive than a marginal product
approach."48 However, this conclusion was based on the authors'
belief that the agency problems of grabbing and leaving could be
curtailed by the creation of firm-specific capital-i.e., capital "that a
departing lawyer cannot easily take . .. with him or duplicate ...
outside the firm."49 They specify two sources of firm-specific capital.
The first is the institutional knowledge of the client's business, which
is typically developed over a period of years. This situation provides
the incumbent firm with an inherent cost advantage and imposes costs
on a client who might otherwise be inclined to price shop. The
second source of firm-specific capital is the firm's general reputation
for quality work, which might be signaled by (a) its existing base of
sophisticated and prestigious clients ° or (b) a large number of firm
partners who author law review articles and treatises or participate in
professional panels in their areas of expertise. 1
The primary competitive advantage conferred by firm-specific
capital, according to Gilson and Mnookin, is that clients are attracted
to the firm rather than its individual lawyers. Further, to reduce the
attendant uncertainty regarding their most serious legal problems,
these clients are willing to pay a premium for access to the firm's
lawyers. The upshot is that in a sharing firm with copious amounts of
firm-specific capital, partners have less ability to grab and less
incentive to leave. This equilibrium would explain the remarkable
47. See Profit Sharing, supra note 34, at 352; see also Success and Failure, supra note
35, § 7.4.2.2 ("While it is easy to say that [partner] compensation is determined by
contribution, it is harder to implement. Even partnerships that use the performance-based
approach suffer from defections and breakups.").
48. See Profit Sharing, supra note 34, at 353.
49. Id. at 356.
50. Id. at 360-62. This information is now actively aggregated by the legal press. See,
e.g, The NLJ Client List-Who Represents Corporate America, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 12, 2005,
at 51 (listing outside counsel to the 250 largest publicly-held corporations in the United
States).
51. See Profit Sharing, supra note 34, at 364. Although this might be an effective
strategy for an individual lawyer to build his or her reputation and client base, Gilson and
Mnookin suggest that a firm might be willing to make an institutional commitment to
these types of activities in order to burnish the firm's reputation. See id. at 365 n.89
(discussing how client seminars can be used to showcase "the firm's services rather than
... the talents of a particular lawyer").
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profitability and stability of lockstep firms such as Cravath, Swaine &
Moore. Based on the firm's towering profitability figures as reported
in The American Lawyer, Gilson and Mnookin express doubt that
Cravath's partners could make more money somewhere else. "In
other words," the authors note, "there is plenty of firm-specific
capital to 'glue' the partnership together."52 Further, the problem of
partner shirking is constrained by a careful and prolonged
socialization and vetting process for partner that begins by recruiting
only super-achievers from the nation's elite law schools. 3 Of course,
as Gilson and Mnookin acknowledge, superior profitability is not an
attribute of the sharing model per se. Rather, the firm must begin
with a critical mass of firm-specific capital-e.g., large institutional
clients and firm prestige-in order to make the model self-
sustaining. 4
For the purposes of this study, Gilson's and Mnookin's work
generates two relatively straightforward hypotheses. First, assuming
that the single-tier firm is more likely to fit the sharing model, and
that two-tier firms more closely track the marginal productivity
approach, we would expect to observe a relatively small cohort of
single-tier firms with superior profitability. Second, these single-tier
firms will most likely have a superior reputation vis-A-vis their two-
tier competitors.
B. Samuelson and Jaffe
The only published large-scale empirical study of law firm
profitability is a 1990 article in the Boston University Law Review by
Professor Samuelson and Professor Jaffe." The study drew upon an
52. See id. at 356.
53. See id. at 375-80. Elite single-tier law firms may, in fact, do a better job than most
at eliminating the potential of shirking through careful selection. For example, at Cravath,
Swaine & Moore, admission to the partnership requires a unanimous vote of the
partnership. See Part I The Meaning of Partnership in 1996, in Supplement: Partnership
Retreat Notebook, AM. LAW., June 1996, at 8 [hereinafter Meaning of Partnership].
54. See Profit Sharing, supra note 34, at 381 ("[O]ur analysis suggests a paradox:
'Sharing' enhances the success of successful firms with substantial firm-specific capital
while contributing to the instability of less successful firms without much firm-specific
capital.").
55. See Law Firm Profitability, supra note 35. The results of this study are also
reported in Chapter 7 of Professor Samuelson's treatise on law firm management. See
Success and Failure, supra note 35. Two articles published in The American Lawyer
during the 1990s reported the results of regression analysis with PPP serving as the
dependent variable. Compare David H. Maister, Where the Profits Come From, AM.
LAW., Sept. 1993, at 39 (finding that presence in New York City has a major determinant
of law firm profitability in the Am Law 100 and that law firm size is "zero factor"), with
Kyle Chadwick & Ramsey Hanna, Predicting Profitability, AM. LAW., July-Aug. 1994, at
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impressive dataset assembled by Price Waterhouse for the purpose of
providing consulting services to its law firm clients. The sample,
which contained 219 law firms, was based upon a twenty-five-page
questionnaire to be completed by "someone in the [law] firm with
access to the most confidential information (such as net income
figures for each partner and salary information for each associate)."56
Although some of the firms were relatively small by contemporary
standards (e.g., one-third had less than sixty-four lawyers), the
authors reported that sixty of the nation's sixty-eight largest law firms
were participants in the study.57 Because participation in the study
was voluntary, Samuelson and Jaffe acknowledge that their sample
probably contains a self-selection bias in favor of larger, more
profitable law firms that could afford the services offered by Price
Waterhouse and would generally welcome a comparison with their
peers. To increase the response rate, firms were promised
confidentiality as a condition of their participation."
The primary research question of the study was to determine
what firm characteristics were associated with higher firm
profitability. The dataset included several useful variables, such as
firm size, the number of hours billed by associates and partners,
billing rates, partner compensation (i.e., lockstep versus marginal
product basis), location in New York City, and size of non-legal
staff.59 Samuelson and Jaffe also coded for "tall" organizational
structures, which included classification for lawyers beyond the
traditional partner-associate distinction, such as "non-equity partner,"
"permanent associate," "junior partner," "senior attorney," and
"participating associate."6 Thus, under their methodology, a two-tier
law firm would be coded as "tall." Among other hypotheses,
63 (reporting that law firm size, after controlling for number of branch offices, is
correlated with higher firm profit; also finding that, all else equal, profitability is associated
with fewer female attorneys and more partners from top-tier schools). In addition, it is
likely that law firm consultants have amassed statistical evidence on which types of law
firm structures result in higher profitability. However, we would expect such reports to be
recycled and sold to numerous clients rather than published in a law journal article-i.e.,
given away for free.
56. Law Firm Profitability, supra note 35, at 199.
57. Id. at 199.
58. Id. at 199-200.
59. Id. at 193-98, 201-03. The data, which were collected in 1985 and 1986, also
included the number of computer workstations. Although technology is still likely to be a
source of competitive advantage, the low cost of PCs and ubiquity of Internet connectivity
probably renders this variable irrelevant.
60. Id. at 197, 202.
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Samuelson and Jaffe theorized that "the new 'tall' model generates
more profits than the traditional 'flat' one. 61
Using multivariate linear regression analysis with PPP as the
dependent variable,62  Samuelson and Jaffe identified several
significant relationships. For example, the number of hours billed by
associates and partners was a strong determinant of profitability, as
was the size of the non-legal staff. Location in New York City was
the only geographic variable associated with higher PPP. The
number of associates was also associated with higher profitability,
while the number of partners had a negative effect. These findings, as
the authors noted, suggest that firm size and leverage, as well as
admission to partnership, are relevant determinants of firm
profitability.63
In terms of the single-tier versus two-tier distinction, the study
found no significant relationship between tall organizational
structures and higher profitability. One of the limitations of the
Samuelson-Jaffe study, however, is that it is unclear whether the
authors distinguished between equity and nonequity partners when
they calculated their dependent variable. Thus, insofar as nonequity
partners are functionally the same as senior associates (i.e., their
compensation is not primarily a function of firm profits), and total
partners were included in the denominator of the PPP calculation, the
profitability of two-tier partnerships for the true owners of the firm
(i.e., the equity partners) was probably underestimated. Similarly, the
study also found that the lockstep compensation system was
associated with higher profitability. Yet, because the study had no
control variable for reputation or prestige, it remains unclear whether
lockstep compensation per se contains incentives that foster long-
term profitability, or, as Gilson and Mnookin suggest,' 4 whether only
highly profitable and prestigious firms have sufficient firm-specific
capital (i.e., reputation) to make lockstep compensation a stable and
prosperous long-term strategy.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 201 & n.79.
63. Id. at 204-09 & tbl.2. Samuelson and Jaffe had independent variables for firm
size and partner-associate ratio ("leverage"). However, when included in the same
regression as number of partners and number of associates, both variables had no
statistical significance. Obviously, firm size and number of associates and partners are
highly co-linear with each other. Yet, because the authors' sample contained many
smaller firms, which would presumably be disadvantaged by a smaller pool of specialized
talent, there appeared to be a reasonable theoretical basis for including all of these
variables in the model. The authors note that both firm size and leverage are "subsumed
by other measures of size." Id. at 204.
64. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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The dataset assembled for this study has strengths and
weaknesses compared to the Price Waterhouse dataset utilized by
Samuelson and Mnookin. The most significant improvement is that
PPP are clearly defined as profits per equity partner. In addition, I
have included variables for firm prestige.' The division between
single-tier and two-tier firms roughly tracks the distinction between
"flat" and "tall" law firms. However, in my dataset, a tall law firm
with one class of partners and multiple classes of nonpartner lawyers
(e.g., associate, permanent associate, of counsel) is coded as single-
tier. The major advantage of the Price Waterhouse data was the
coding for lockstep compensation. Presumably there are some single-
tier firms that still utilize this sharing approach based purely on
seniority.66
C. Advent of the Two-Tier Structure
As noted earlier, a steady number of Am Law 200 law firms
continue to make the transition from single-tier to two-tier (or multi-
tier) partnerships. 67  At first glance, this longstanding trend might
suggest that two-tier partnerships represent a relatively new
management innovation that is destined to eventually replace the
traditional single-tier model. Although its adoption has varied
65. See infra Parts II.A. & II.B.5.
66. See, e.g., Meaning of Partnership, supra note 53, at 13 (reporting detailed 1996
survey of partnership characteristics among Am Law 100 firms and noting that four highly
profitable and prestigious firms among the seventy respondents still used the lockstep
model).
67. See Frankel, supra note 12, at 92 (noting that "Ujust 23 Am Law 100 firms have
only one partnership tier, compared to 55 in 1994, the year we first began tracking
nonequity partnership"); see also Vanessa Blum, On the Way, but Not There Yet; Firms
Are Making Greater Use of Nonequity Positions in Promotions, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 17,
2000, at 27 (reporting that in 1999, "62 of the highest grossing U.S. firms reported using
some kind of multitier partnership structure-up from just 34 in 1991"); Giuliani, supra
note 33, at 28 (commenting in 1990 that "[in the past decade 21 of 77 of the nation's
largest firms surveyed by The American Lawyer introduced a second tier; 42 of those 77
firms... now have at least two types of partners").
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considerably by geographic market,68 the two-tier partnership has, in
fact, been utilized by many law firms for decades.69
At least initially, the rationale for two-tier partnerships was
relatively consistent. In contrast to Galanter and Palay's
paradigmatic "promotion-to-partner tournament," which described a
seven- to ten-year process of vetting associates that ended with a
single "up-or-out" vote for partnership,7°  the early two-tier
partnerships essentially operated as a two-stage tournament.71  In
stage one, which lasted approximately six years, associates who
demonstrated sufficient work ethic and technical proficiency were
rewarded with nonequity partnership. In stage two, which took two
or more years to complete, lawyers were given the opportunity (aided
by the title of "partner") to demonstrate their ability to attract clients
and legal work to the firm. But similar to single-tier partnerships, the
68. See, e.g., Bradford W. Hildebrandt & Jack Kaufman, Two-Tier Partnerships: A
New Look, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 8, 1990, at 19 (noting that a "substantial number of firms-
particularly in Chicago, Boston, Washington, D.C., and Los Angeles-adopted this [two-
tier] system years ago"); Thom Weidlich, The Legal Field Sees a Glimmer of Recovery,
NAT'L L.J., Sept. 27, 1993, at S2 (quoting the managing partner of Chicago-based Winston
& Strawn, "We've had a two-tiered partnership for 20 years. It's the exception, not the
rule, on both coasts, but it's reasonably prevalent in Chicago"; quoting the co-chair of
Ross & Hardies, "We don't have an up-or-out system [a hallmark of the single-tier model]
as many of the New York firms do").
69. For example, in 1983, Hildebrandt, Inc., a renowned specialist in law firm
management, reported "many firms throughout the country have had two-tier
partnerships for years, though neither the general public nor the legal community seems to
be aware of this. The concept is not new, just the publicity." Brad Hildebrandt & Jack
Kaufman, The 'Two-Tier' Partnership: A Solution to the Shrinking Pie?, NAT'L L. J., Nov.
28, 1983, at 14. As evidence that the legal climate was in a period of change, the authors
commented that on "75 percent of our recent consulting assignments we have been asked
what we know and think about two-tier partnerships .... Many stress that they are
merely curious, and would never use one of these approaches. But they are nevertheless
beginning to ask." Id.
70. GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 1, at 100-02 (discussing how the prestige and
profits conferred by partnership entices young associates to engage in a grueling and
uncertain battle for promotion). Although Galanter and Palay briefly note the trend
toward two-tier partnerships, see id. at 58, the bulk of their analysis suggests a single one-
stage tournament.
71. As one law firm consultant observed in 1990, the wave of new two-tier
partnerships represented a departure from the two-tier model. "In many of the older two-
tier partnerships, the income or non-equity partner classification was a step in the
progression towards becoming an equity partner. In the new form of two-tier partnership,
however, non-equity partner usually becomes a permanent position, and that lawyer is
never considered for equity partnership." Robert W. Denney, A New Two-Tier Idea,
NAT'L L.J., Sept. 24, 1990, at 13.
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early two-tier model often culminated in an up-or-out vote for
promotion to equity partner.72
However, since the mid-1980s, many Am Law 200 law firms have
implemented two-tier or multi-tier partnership structures that attempt
to optimize their human capital, and therefore their long-term
profitability and stability, by stratifying lawyers according to their
abilities and workplace expectations. For example, law firm
consultant Thomas Clay advises clients that there are five types of
partners:
" Entrepreneurial leader: Consistently keeps multiple
partners, associates and paralegals busy, often in many
practice areas. His or her presence drives the firm
brand, transitioning relationships to others and creating
deeper, broader relations with clients. These partners
are very rare [and the most valuable].
" Business-generating partner: Capable of staying busy
and keeping one to three others busy on a consistent
basis with their own business and growing existing client
relationships cultivated by others.
" Self-sufficient partner: Someone who keeps busy but
usually gets a portion of work from others and manages
to export a portion of work to others. He or she
leverages equally the firm's brand and his or her
personal market presence for marketing.
" Service partner: Usually a sophisticated lawyer and
client manager who can manage a service delivery team
but does not generate a significant volume of work on
his or her own. This type of partner would not meet the
test for self-sufficiency.
" Technical specialist partner: A sophisticated problem-
solver who is often uncomfortable with the social
72. See Hildebrandt & Kaufman, supra note 68, at 19 (describing structure and
mechanics of traditional two-tier structure and noting, in 1990, that "[u]ntil recently,
income [i.e., nonequity] partnership was not considered to be a permanent position"); H.
Edward Wesemann, The Nonequity Tier: Firms May Create Long-Term Problems by
Putting People in 'Limbo', LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 3, 2003, at 40 (noting that until recently,
"few firms have spent time fretting about documenting what it means to be a nonequity
partner because it was only meant to be a transitionary classification").
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aspects of client interaction. This person will generally
not lead a legal team but may lead a project team on a
specific legal issue.73
Clay suggests that the proper delineation of equity and
nonequity partners tracks the divide between business generators and
"partners that fit into the category of self-sufficient, service or
technical specialist partners. '74
D. Intended and Unintended Incentives in Two-Tier Firms
On one hand, the movement toward the two-tier format may be
viewed by some associates as an attempt by powerful partners to
hoard firm profits.75  However, many law firm consultants and
managing partners argue that most associates welcome the
opportunity and flexibility of a properly structured two-tier system.
For example, lawyers who have demonstrated sufficient productivity
and technical skills to warrant promotion to nonequity partner now
have the title and the institutional support to focus on business
development. 76  Conversely, some associates welcome the relative
security and reduced professional demands of nonequity status.77
73. Jeff Blumenthal, Bitter Medicine: Law Firms in a Squeeze Increasingly Take
Difficult Step of Turning Equity Partners into Nonequity Partners, BROWARD DAILY Bus.
REV. (S. Fla.), Dec. 9, 2002, at A9.
74. Id. The same article quotes the chairman of Duane Morris, an Am Law 200 firm,
"I think nonequity partners fill a very important role at a firm. You need business
generators, but you also need people to do the work." Id.
75. See, e.g., Jeff Blumenthal, Two-Tier Partnership Finds a Place in Philly, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 29, 1998, at 1 (quoting a law firm partner, "I think [the two-tier
structure] would interfere with the spirit we're trying to engender .... The only reason to
do that is pure economics, and I think that's selfish. If a young attorney earns the
recognition, partnership should be willing to share the wealth.").
76. See., e.g., Blum, supra note 67 (quoting R. Bruce McLean, firm chairman of Akin
Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, "[The two-tier system] gives our young lawyers the tools to
go into the marketplace and develop business" and that "to the outside world, Akin
Gump's 'income' and 'capital' partners are indistinguishable."); Blumenthal, supra note 73
(quoting Gregory Jordan, chairman of Reed Smith, "[By promoting them to nonequity
status], we give them the tools of partnership to grow their practice .... We don't have an
up or out approach with nonequity partners, so it's not necessary that they be business-
getters at that stage.").
77. See, e.g., Giuliani, supra note 33, at 30 (noting in 1990 that "[in several surveys of
large firms more than 75 percent of associates said they believed that a two-tier
partnership was inevitable at their firms and that it was a highly desirable innovation"
because it offered an alternative to high quality lawyers who were unwilling to make the
personal sacrifices required under the traditional up or out single-tier system);
Hildebrandt & Kaufman, supra note 68 (noting that the "income partner" track is likely
perceived by some associates "as a possible career alternative or lifestyle choice" that may
"help recruiting rather than hinder it").
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Hildebrandt consultant Larry Bright is quoted as saying that a two-
tier partnership structure allows a firm to "keep the good people
while controlling the pot .... Most second-tier partners make, not a
stratospheric income, but a handsome living. And it enables the firm
to keep people who are good lawyers but don't want to sacrifice their
personal lives in order to make partner."78
In addition to the perceived flexibility of the two-tier structure,
the nonequity track can be used as a management tool to prune the
partnership of unproductive equity members. Especially during
economic downturns, the promotion-to-partnership tournament can
actually work in reverse, as pressure builds within two-tier firms to
quietly demote (or de-equitize) unproductive equity partners to the
nonequity level.79 Indeed, there is some empirical evidence that a
perpetual tournament involving both associates and partners has
begun to emerge.8° As shown in Figure 1, data from Altman Weil's
2004 Survey of Law Firm Economics suggests that the number of
billable hours by law firm associates has, contrary to popular
perceptions, remained remarkably stable between 1985 and 2003 at
1,850 hours.81 Yet, the average number of hours worked by partners
in their twenty-fifth to twenty-ninth years (nonequity and equity
combined) has steadily risen from 1,538 to 1,703.82 Since 1997, the
average number of billable hours by these lawyers has consistently
been above 1,700.83 It is certainly possible that higher billable hours
logged by partners can be explained by two factors: (a) the growing
ranks of nonequity service partners, who earn their keep by billing
78. Ronald J. Fleury, Tier Partners: What's in a Name?, N.J. L.J., Aug. 23, 1990, at 1,
22; see also Matt Fleischer-Black, Indiana Firm Reconsiders Nonequity Tier, THE
RECORDER, Feb. 2, 2004, at 7 (quoting Hildebrandt consultant Joel Henning on the
appeal of nonequity partnership, "It's a pluralistic profession today, with ... people who
have different levels of commitment to the practice. Thus, you have terrific lawyers who
want to have good jobs with good firms, but are not interested in collections and debt
structures.").
79. See Blumenthal, supra note 73 (reporting observation by legal recruiter from
Major Hagan & Africa that the economic downturn in 2001 and 2002 has been
accompanied by "an upswing in de-equitizations").
80. In his recent book, Professor Regan makes a similar observation. See MILTON C.
REGAN, JR., EAT WHAT You KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL STREET LAWYER 37 (2004)
(noting that the tournament within the firm "is not just for promotion to partner any
more. It continues after partnership, as partners must compete for compensation, status,
and continued employment.").
81. ALTMAN WEIL, THE SURVEY OF LAW FIRM ECONOMICS 138 (2004) (presenting
tabular data in which fifth-year associates averaged of 1,838 hours in 1985 and 1,851 hours
in 2003 with a peak of 1,881 hours in 1988 and 2002).
82. Id.
83. Id.
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COMPARISON OF AVERAGE ANNUAL CLIENT (BILLABLE) HOURSFigure 1" FOR 25 TO 29 YEAR PARTNERS AND 5 YEAR ASSOCIATES
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hours alongside associates; and (b) the growing specter of de-
equitization, which mitigates the potential for shirking.
In general, law firm consultants and managing partners within
the Am Law 200 marketplace readily concede that the movement
toward two-tier partnerships has been driven by economic factors.8'
The perceived benefits of this structure fall roughly into four
categories: (1) improved client service through lower lawyer
attrition;85 (2) an elongated evaluation period that reduces errors in
promotion to equity partner;86 (3) alignment of voting power with
84. See Fleury, supra note 78 (noting in 1990 that consultants and managing partners
"agree that.., the segregation of partners into tiers is motivated by purely economic
considerations"); Hildebrandt & Kaufman, supra note 68 (noting in 1990 that in most
cases, the decision to adopt a two-tier system is "driven by law firm economics").
85. See, e.g., D.M. Osborne, Latham Opts for Two Tiers, AM. LAW., Jan.-Feb. 1996,
at 13 (reporting that "[c]lients service concerns were the impetus for the partnership
rejiggering at [Latham & Watkins]" and quoting Latham partner that "[cjlients are
demanding that experienced people stay with them and that there not be a revolving door
of junior and midlevel people on their accounts"); see also Jamie Heller, Murtha, Cullina
Forms Two-Tier Partner System to Keep 'Good Legal Technicians', CONN. L. TRIB., June
24, 1991, at 3 (reporting that large law firm in Connecticut adopted a two-tier structure "to
retain lawyers who are excellent 'legal technicians' but whom the firm would not
otherwise name equity partners").
86. See, e.g., Giuliani, supra note 33, at 28 (asserting that one of the best reasons to
adopt a two-tier partnership is "to give partners more time to evaluate" potential equity
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economic contribution, which reduces the likelihood of rainmaker
defections;87 and (4) favorable market dynamics spawned by higher
profits per partner, such as easier recruitment of lateral associates and
partners and the ability to attract higher caliber law firms for
potential mergers.88 Regarding this last factor, law firms have
essentially realized that PPP is a function of both the numerator (total
firm profits) and the denominator (the number of equity partners).89
In theory, two-tier partnerships should be highly profitable because
this structure is explicitly designed to restrict the denominator to a
small number of talented lawyers who are proven business
generators.
Notwithstanding the perceived benefits of two-tier partnerships,
law firm consultants also caution their clients that the creation of a
nonequity tier can produce disastrous results if the structure is poorly
designed or poorly executed. Law firm consultant H. Edward
Wesemann notes that "[a]dvising a likable associate that she has been
elected to nonequity partnership is certainly a less onerous task than
telling her she has been rejected for equity partnership and must
either remain an associate or leave the firm."9 Thus, some law firm
consultants contend that too many law firms that switch to the two-
tier format neutralize potential benefits by promoting too many
lawyers to the nonequity tier. 91
The use of a nonequity tier to deal with unproductive equity
partners also presents serious potential risks for a law firm. For
example, rather than deliver an intended "wake-up" call, the client-
service ethic of de-equitized partners may instead deteriorate, causing
assigning partners to favor senior associates with comparable skill and
partners); Hildebrandt & Kaufman, supra note 68 (arguing that the "true value" of
adopting a two-tier system is the opportunity to "raise the standards" for what it means to
be an equity partner).
87. See, e.g., Giuliani, supra note 33, at 30 (observing that "most firms that have
created two-tier systems. . . want[ ] to prevent dilution of equity partner voting interests").
88. See, e.g., Blumenthal, supra note 73, at 9 ("Firms want the good public relations
that go along with high PPP. It helps with recruiting both lateral partners and upper-
echelon, entry-level talent as well as retaining key personnel."); Wesemann, supra note 72
(reporting the increasing importance of PPP for recruitment and mergers).
89. Wesemann, supra note 72; see also Blum, supra note 67 ("It's simple mathematics.
Remove from the total a firm's more junior partners-who tend to take home a smaller
piece of the pie-and the average will jump.").
90. Wesemann, supra note 72.
91. Id. (discussing tendency toward overly liberal promotion policies in two-tier
firms); see also Blumenthal, supra note 75, at 1 (quoting Altman Weil consultant Thomas
Clay, "Too many firms.., use the [two-tier] system to avoid making tough decisions about
the professional futures of borderline associates. The result ... is that firm managers often
promote associates who are not worthy of the distinction to partner.").
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a more responsive attitude. Thus, as their work dries up, they
become a pariah with no realistic prospect of making a substantial
contribution to the firm.92
In summary, the two-tier (or multi-tier) partnership model offers
a theoretically coherent and appealing basis for producing a more
stable and profitable law firm. Yet if a law firm's management does
not adequately comprehend and safeguard against the potential
pitfalls, the two-tier system may create a set of deleterious incentives
that may undermine rather than enhance a firm's long-term
profitability.93 Fortunately, the dataset assembled for this study
permits us to more closely examine these possibilities.
II. SUMMARY OF DATA AND METHODOLOGY
This study uses descriptive statistics to delineate statistically
significant differences between single-tier and two-tier firms.
Drawing upon these results it then uses multivariate regression
analysis to: (a) examine what factors are relevant to adopting a two-
tier structure; (b) explore whether the determinants of firm
profitability are different in single-tier versus two-tier firms; and (c)
assess whether the switching to the two-tier format, after controlling
for a variety of other variables, is associated with higher firm
profitability.
The interpretations and conclusions presented in this study
depend upon an awareness of the data's strengths and limitations and
the accuracy of the theory that underlies the statistical models.
Therefore, Part II provides a detailed discussion of the dataset used in
this study. Section A provides some background information on how
the data was assembled, including the analytical reasons for including
certain categories of information. Section B explains the theoretical
basis for several important independent variables used in this study
and, where necessary, how these variables were created. Table 1
summarizes descriptive statistics of several key variables.
92. Wesemann, supra note 72 (commenting that de-equitization rarely produces the
desired "wake-up call" and that these reclassifications "only exacerbate whatever
deficiencies were previously evident in the demoted attorney's work"); see also
Blumenthal, supra note 73 (reporting observation of law firm consultant Joel Rose that
de-equitization "almost always creates a cancerous situation at a firm").
93. Cf. Denney, supra note 71 (summarizing the microeconomic factors that militate
against the trend toward two-tier partnerships and concluding that law firms "should be
increasing the number of equity partners rather than limiting them").
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables
[Vol. 84
Variable Mean en25th Median P n75th 1Std. Dev. tValid NPercentile Percentile
Firm Size, 2003 466 253 354 578 347.9 N=200
Firm Size, 1993 296 171 234 354 206.3 N=196
2003 PPP
(Am Law 200) $761,025 $471,250 $610,000 $890,000 $454,939 N=200
1993 PPP
(Am Law 100) $440,960 $300,000 $380,000 $490,000 $237,807 N=99
NE:E Ratio 0.40 0.02 0.33 0.60 0.475 N=190
Leverage
(Lawyers per 3.51 2.72 3.39 4.13 1.08 N=199
Equity Partners)
% Lawyers in
NYC and Global 21.8% 0.0% 9.6% 28.7% 29.5% N=192
Cities, 2003
% Lawyers in
NYC and Global 20.6% 0.0% 1.5% 25.3% 32.7% N=196
Cities, 1993
Avg. Associate
Hours Billed per 44.7 42.9 44.5 46.6 2.95 N=148
Week
Likelihood of
Staying Two 3.58 3.27 3.63 3.92 0.50 N=147
Years Score
Vault Prestige
Score 5.97 5.12 5.78 6.64 1.02 N=100
(1 to 10)
Mid-Level
Prestige Score 4.04 3.75 4.00 4.32 0.45 N=148
(1 to 5)
Number of
Branch Offices, 9.08 5.00 8.00 11.00 7.35 N=192
2003
Number of
Branch Offices, 6.16 3.00 5.00 8.00 5.29 N=196
1993
Change in NE:E .239 .000 .210 .416 .453 N=168
93-03
* Sources: Calculations made by author from data drawn from the 2004 Am Law 200, the
1994 Am Law 100, the 1994 and 2004 National Law Journal 250; the 2004 Am Law Midlevel
Associates Survey; and the Vault Guide to the Top 100 Law Firms (5th ed.).
A. The Base Dataset
The core dataset for this study is the 2004 Am Law 200, which is
comprised of the 200 largest U.S. law firms based on gross revenues.
This list is published annually in the July (Am Law 100) and August
(Am Law 101-200) issues of The American Lawyer. The financial
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and other descriptive data included in the 2004 listing are based on
operating results from 2003. From this information, I generated a
large number of additional variables for each law firm. To create a
set of time series variables for Am Law firms, I added 1993 financial
data on the Am Law 100, which was published by The American
Lawyer in the summer of 1994.9' Because the Am Law "Second
Hundred" did not appear until 1999, my ten-year longitudinal sample
is limited to the eighty-seven law firms that appeared on both the
2004 Am Law 200 and the 1994 Am Law 100. I also generated a five-
year longitudinal sample for the 174 law firms that appeared on both
the 2004 and 1999 Am Law 200.
I further augmented the dataset by adding information from the
National Law Journal, which annually publishes data on the 250
largest law firms based on the number of lawyers ("NLJ 250"). In
general, there is a very large overlap between the Am Law 200 and
the NLJ 250. Variables added from this source fell roughly into two
categories: (1) number of lawyers in a specific U.S. city, which I
aggregated based on location within a metropolitan area ("MA") and
utilized to create a variable, discussed below, to partially control for
market segmentation;95 and (2) the number of lawyers within a firm
categorized as equity and nonequity.96 The equity/nonequity data is
necessary to create the ratio of nonequity to equity lawyers (NE:E),
which is a variable that reflects deviation away from a single-tier
model. In a single-tier model, NE:E should be zero because the
numerator (i.e., the number of nonequity partners) is by definition
zero. Because the NU 250 has been published for nearly two
decades, I was able to generate various longitudinal variables,
including the change in NE:E between 1993 and 2003.
94. The American Lawyer, July/Aug. 1994 (publishing tables of financial information
on the 100 largest U.S. law firms based on annual revenues).
95. See infra Part II.B.2. This geographic data is ultimately the focus of a separate
empirical project. See William D. Henderson, The Changing Economic Geography of the
Am Law 200 (forthcoming SSRN working paper, summer 2006).
96. The American Lawyer annually publishes the number of lawyers and equity
partners for each Am Law 200 firm. It also calculates the average partner compensation,
which in a two-tier firm is usually significantly lower than average PPP. However, the
magazine has not consistently published the number of nonequity partners or the
combined total of equity and nonequity partners. It is worth noting that the delineation
between equity and nonequity partners in the NLJ 250 is determined by the law firms. In
contrast, the existence of a two-tier partnership under The American Lawyer definition is
determined by applying a uniform criteria, which has produced some dissonance within
firms. See infra note 109 and accompanying text. The important point is that the National
Law Journal data on the number of equity-nonequity partners has significant limitations.
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In order to gauge how internal firm dynamics affect firm
profitability, including how these dynamics might diverge in two-tier
versus single-tier firms, I added data from the 2004 American Lawyer
Mid-Level Associate Survey ("Mid-Level Survey"), which was
compiled from more than 4,300 survey questionnaires from associates
at approximately 180 large law firms.97 Full or partial data was
available on approximately 145 law firms from the 2004 Am Law 200.
I was specifically interested in the internal firm work ethic and the
level of attrition. As a rough measure of how hard associates work
within a firm, I utilized the "average number of hours billed per
week" from the Mid-Level Survey.98 All other things being equal, we
would expect profits to be a function of hours billed. As a proxy for
anticipated future attrition, I used the average response score for
"likelihood of staying two years." 99
Regarding associate attrition, it should be noted that its effects
can be difficult to interpret. On the one hand, excessive turnover can
lead to poor client service. As noted earlier, the two-tier firm is
sometimes advocated as a structure that can mitigate this problem."'
High attrition can also be a sign that a firm is not paying associates a
competitive salary, which can be a symptom of poor management.
Conversely, if we envision associates working within the promotion-
to-partnership tournament,11 attrition of less talented or less
dedicated associates is a built-in part of the model.102 Further, it is at
least plausible that this process is more rigorous in single-tier firms,
since the tournament prize is equity partnership.
Finally, I theorized that a firm's relative prestige (i.e.,
reputational capital) could provide a competitive advantage in at least
three ways. First, higher prestige can affect client demand and permit
97. See The Mid-Levels Speak: Associates Survey, AM. LAW., Oct. 2004, at 131, 133
(reporting a 44% response rate).
98. Id. at 131
99. Id. The reasons for an associate leaving can run in a variety of directions. For
example, the billable-hours requirement may be too demanding, or an associate may
realize that he or she will not make partner. Alternatively, associates in some prestigious
firms may be more likely to receive an attractive offer from outside the firm. See infra
note 163 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
101. See generally GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 1, at 100-02 (discussing the
dynamics of the promotion-to-partnership tournament).
102. For example, when Cravath, Swaine & Moore, a highly prestigious and profitable
single-tier firm in New York, "lost 96 of its 300 associates in 1993 and 67 more in 1994," a
Cravath partner shrugged off the loss to the poor economy of the previous years and
suggested that the firm "didn't lose anyone [we] really wanted to keep." Karen Dillon,
Brand Names at the Brink, AM. LAW., May 1995, at 5, 7.
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a firm to charge higher fees.t°3 Second, prestigious law firms are
probably more likely to have a client base that is more loyal to the
firm than the billing partner (i.e., firm-specific capital). As a result,
prestigious law firms may be less vulnerable to grabbing and
leaving." Third, prestige can also be a valuable firm attribute in the
recruitment of new associates, providing an employer with a non-
monetary but important competitive advantage. 105 This study utilizes
two proxies for firm reputation: (1) a prestige score published in 2002
by Vault, Inc., which compiles career information on various
industries and professions, including high-end legal services ("The
Vault 100");1°6 and (2) a prestige score generated by The American
Lawyer as part of its Mid-Level Survey.'017
B. Key Independent Variables
This Section summarizes the rationale and method of calculation
for five important independent variables used in this study: (1) a tier
variable, which distinguishes between single-tier and two-tier firms;
(2) the proportion of lawyers located in New York City and eight
103. Cf. Law Firm Profitability, supra note 35, at 209 (suggesting that large firms in
New York City may be more profitable because of "client price insensitivity"). Similarly,
Bruce MacEwen, a well-known blogger on law firm economics, has commented that on
important legal matters, "Nobody ever got fired for hiring Skadden [Arps, Slate, Meagher
& Flom]," a highly profitable and prestigious law firm headquartered in New York City.
See Nobody Ever Got Fired for Hiring Skadden (Apr. 24, 2004), http://www.bmacewen.
com/blog/archives/2004/04/nobody-evergot fired for hiring-skadden.html.
•104. Cf. ROBERT W. HILLMAN, HILLMAN ON LAWYER MOBILITY 1:5-6 (1997)
(noting that lockstep compensation systems, which once prevailed in larger firms, have
come under siege because "increased mobility has permitted lawyers with the ability to
transport clients and revenues to demand a larger share of firm income").
105. For example, Anthony Ciolli recently conducted a large-scale empirical study to
identify which elite law schools provide prospective students with the best placement
prospects at the nation's top law firms. See Anthony Ciolli, The Legal Employment
Market: Determinants of Elite Firm Placement and How Law Schools Stack Up, 45
JURIMETRICS J. 413, 413 (2005). Ciolli determined the desirability of law firms based on
composite score derived from PPP and the Vault prestige score. Id. at 417-18. Using a
massive amount of data culled from Martindale-Hubbell, including geographic as well as
firm placement of elite law school graduates, Ciolli was able to show that the likelihood of
landing a highly prestigious law firm job is incrementally increased by attending certain
law schools. Id. at 428-31. For example, if maximizing placement odds is the primary
determinant of where a student should attend law school, Ciolli shows that a student
would be better off attending Chicago or Columbia rather than higher-ranked Yale or
Stanford. Id. Important variables in Ciolli's model include the lack of a class rank, which
helps students, and a pass/no-pass grading system, which has a negative effect on
placement. Id. at 433-36.
106. See BROOK MOSHAN GESSER ET AL., VAULT GUIDE TO THE TOP 100 LAW
FIRMS 13-14 (2003).
107. See Mid-Levels Speak, supra note 97, at 131.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
"global" international cities, which I use to partially control for
market segmentation; (3) firm leverage, which measures the balance
between equity partners and all other lawyers within the firm; (4) the
ratio of nonequity to equity partners, which is a type of firm leverage
and reflects a strategy choice on the part of firm management; and (5)
the Vault and Mid-Level Survey prestige variables.
1. Tier Structure
For the purposes of this study, I classified law firms as single-tier
or two-tier using data from the 2004 Am Law 200, 1999 Am Law 200,
and the 1995 Am Law 100. The American Lawyer classifies a firm as
single-tier if all partners "receive a Schedule K-1 tax form and receive
no more than half their compensation on a fixed-income basis." 108 (It
is worth noting, however, that this definition classifies some
partnerships as two-tier even though the firm's management claims
that the firm is single-tier. 10 9) I created a dummy variable to code for
single-tier versus two-tier or multi-tier. I also created a series of
dummy variables to distinguish between firms that remained single-
tier between 1994 and 2003, firms that became two-tier or multi-tier,
and firms that remained two-tier.
Obviously, the use of a single dichotomous variable for tier
structure masks considerable heterogeneity of partnership tracks
among Am Law 200 law firms."0 Although it would be ideal to have
sufficient data to implement a more nuanced coding system, the
theory underlying the single-tier versus two-tier distinction is
relatively simple and theoretically coherent. Specifically, the tier
variable represents two ends of a continuum in which single-tier firms
are more likely to (a) have higher levels of firm-specific capital (i.e.,
clients that are loyal to the firm rather than individual lawyers) and
108. The Am Law 100: A Guide to Our Methodology, AM. LAW., July 2004, at 101
(also noting that "[m]any firms put their first-year equity partners or lateral equity
partners on fixed incomes for a short time. When this is merely a transitional
arrangement, and these partners are otherwise treated as equity partners, we categorize
them as such.").
109. See, e.g., Susan Beck, A Series of Fortunate Events, AM. LAW., Feb. 2005, at 74, 78
(reporting fallout among partners at Bingham McCrutchen after The American Lawyer
reported the firm as two-tier and noting that the chairman of the firm "insists that the firm
still isn't a two-tier system, but is simply following this magazine's definition of an equity
partner"); Frankel, supra note 12, at 93 (quoting chairman of Foley & Lardner, whose firm
was classified as two-tier, stating that the firm has "one class of partners only" and noting
that the first year Foley was identified as a two-tier partnership in the Am Law 100 survey,
he issued a memo that "we had no secret deequitization program").
110. The heterogeneity of two-tier firms, and thus the limitations of this study, is
directly addressed in Part IV.B., infra.
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(b) evenly share the benefits and burdens of partnership (e.g.,
lockstep or modified lockstep compensation). In contrast, two-tier
firms are more likely to (c) have clients that are loyal to individual
lawyers and (d) place greater emphasis on a marginal product
approach (e.g., eat-what-you-kill). Based on the literature review in
Part I, these predicted tendencies are all reasonable assumptions.
2. Proportion of NYC/Global Lawyers
As large corporate law firms, the Am Law 200 is in many
respects a homogeneous group. For example, virtually all of the law
firms in the sample are highly selective in their hiring practices,
recruiting at the nation's most prestigious law schools and requiring
exemplary law school records from graduates of lower-ranked
schools."' The pay range for associates is, not surprisingly, fairly
narrow. The average starting salary is $117,496 with a standard
deviation of $12,972; the top entry-level salary is $140,000, which was
offered by three firms." 2  The average salary of all associates is
$136,024 with a standard deviation of $21,478.113 Yet, at the level of
equity partner compensation, the range of PPP is much wider. The
average 2003 PPP at an Am Law 200 firm is $761,025 with a standard
deviation of $454,939."' Further, sixteen firms posted PPP of more
than $1.5 million, approximately double the average.1 5 Obviously,
within the Am Law 200, equity partner profits are subject to much
greater variability than associate salary.
Some of the large PPP differentials among Am Law 200 firms are
certainly attributable to the proportion of a firm's lawyers in various
geographic markets. On this dimension, the Am Law 200
marketplace is extremely diverse. For example, in this dataset, the
average law firm had an average of 9.08 offices with seventy attorneys
111. For example, BCG Attorney Search, which provides lateral recruitment services
for large law firms, publishes a 281-page compendium of grading and law review
requirements at the nation's top fifty law schools as ranked by U.S. News & World Report.
This manual is explicitly designed to permit law firms to accurately assess law school
performance relative to the law school's prestige. See THE 2004 BCG ATTORNEY
SEARCH GUIDE To CLASS RANKING DISTINCTIONS AND LAW REVIEW (2004), available
at http://www.bcgsearch.com/bcgguide.pdf.
112. These figures were calculated based on data obtained from the 2004 NLJ 250.
NAT'L L.J., Nov. 15, 2004 at 516-27.
113. These figures were calculated based on data obtained from the 2004 American
Lawyer Mid-Level Survey. See Mid-Levels Speak, supra note 97, at 131.
114. See supra Table 1.
115. Author observations of assembled Am Law 200 dataset.
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per office.' 1 6 However, six of these firms had only a single office,'17
and four of these firms posted PPP above the median. In addition,
even though 21.4% (21,210) of all Am Law 200 lawyers in 2003 were
located in the New York City Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical
Area ("CMSA"), fifty-five Am Law 200 law firms had no New York
office.
Starting with the premise that law firm profitability is enhanced
by attracting high-end noncommodity legal work that commands a
premium price, I hypothesized that this type of work is likely to be
concentrated in larger legal markets. I then aggregated the total
number of Am Law 200 lawyers by MA. The top 10 MAs are set
forth in Table 2:
Table 2. Number of Am Law 200 Lawyers by MA
1 # of Am Law 200 % of All Am Law 200
MA Lawyers Lawyers
New York 21,210 21.4%
Washington 13,512 13.6%
Chicago 6,988 7.1%
Los Angeles 6,475 6.5%
San Francisco 5,688 5.7%
Boston 3,904 3.9%
Philadelphia 3,155 3.2%
Atlanta 2,856 2.9%
Houston 2,753 2.8%
Dallas 2,742 2.7%
*Source: Calculations made by author from data drawn from the 2004 National Law
Journal 250.
Next, using the geographic data for each firm in the sample, I
correlated the proportion of firm lawyers located in New York City
with PPP and obtained a remarkably high coefficient: r = .696, p =
.000, n = 192.118 When I performed the same analysis on the
116. These figures were calculated based on data obtained from the 2004 NJ 250. See
supra note 112.
117. Two firms are located in New York, three firms are in Boston (but one recently
dissolved), and one firm is in Washington, D.C.
118. A correlation coefficient (r) is a number that describes a statistical relationship
between two attributes (e.g., PPP and proportion of lawyers located in NYC). It is
expressed as a value between -1 (a perfect negative correlation) and +1 (a perfect positive
correlation). The p-value of a correlation coefficient reflects the probability that r
occurred by chance. For example, if "p<.05", there is less than a 1 in 20 chance that the
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proportion of firm lawyers in Washington, D.C. (the second largest
Am Law 200 location), the correlation coefficient was positive but not
statistically significant (.078, p = .282, n = 192)." 9 When I combined
the proportion of firm lawyers in the other top ten MAs into a single
"Other Major U.S. Cities" statistic, the correlation with PPP was both
negative and statistically significant (-.189, p = .009, n = 192). Finally,
the correlation between PPP and the proportion of the firm's lawyers
in all remaining locations ("Regional Cities") was also negative but
much stronger (-.515, p = .000, n = 192). I performed a similar
analysis with lawyers in international cities and discovered that PPP
was strongly correlated with the proportion of lawyers in the eight
large non-U.S. markets120 (.370, p = .000, n = 192) but uncorrelated
with the proportion of lawyers in all other international locations
(.028, p = .701, n = 192).
Finally, building on these results, I created a single statistic for
the combined proportion of a firm's lawyers in the New York City
MA and these eight "Global" markets. The resulting variable
produced a very high correlation with PPP: .719, p = .000, n = 192.121
In this study, I use this geographic variable as a proxy for the
likelihood that a law firm is attracting high-end noncommodity legal
work. A careful analysis of the profitability data corroborates this
assumption. When the Am Law 200 firms are separated into four
different categories based on the proportion of lawyers in New York
and Global Cities (see Table 3), the differentials in average PPP are
too large to be explained by higher billing rates necessary to support a
higher cost of living, especially since clients have an incentive to
gravitate to lower-cost markets if the nature of the legal services
being offered is truly fungible. Moreover, between 1993 and 2003, the
New York City MA added 9,920 Am Law 200 lawyers-5,000 more
statistical relation occurred randomly; "p<. 0 1" reflects a 1 in 100 chance; "p<.001" reflects
a 1 in 1000 chance, etc.
119. The regression results of Chadwick and Hanna, which was based on Am Law 100
data from 1993, found that "a D.C. home base" was associated with approximately $80,000
in additional PPP after controlling for a variety of other factors. See Chadwick & Hanna,
supra note 55, at 63-64. In contrast, this study utilized the proportion of lawyers located in
the Washington, D.C. MA, which is presumably a more precise measure of any putative
geographic effect.
120. My designation for Global Cities includes seven non-U.S. locations with the most
Am Law 200 lawyers: London (2,867), Paris (1,022), Hong Kong (625), Frankfurt (543),
Brussels (422), Tokyo (389), and Singapore (192). Beijing is also included on this list
because it is the location in China with the largest number of Am Law 200 lawyers (87).
121. For a more detailed explication of how geography is an important and
understudied variable in the legal marketplace, see Henderson, supra note 95 (using this
dataset to study many unusual and surprising patterns between geography and law firm
profitability).
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lawyers than any other U.S. market. 22  Obviously, in terms of
profitability, there appears to be something unique about the New
York City legal market.
Table 3. PPP by Percentage of Lawyers in NYC/Global Cities
Market Mean Percentile Median Percentile Std Valid
Segment 1 25 75 Deviation N
> 50%
NYC / $1,276,618 $877,500 $1,115,000 $1,662,500 $548,036 N=34
Global
10% to
50% NYC $794,417 $560,000 $742,500 $928,750 $315,852 N=60
/ Global
> 0% to
10% NYC $539,884 $445,000 $510,000 $590,000 $160,600 N=43
/ Global
No NYC/
Global $491,727 $365,000 $450,000 $575,000 $170,487 N=55
Lawyers
Group $736,094 $470,000 $595,000 $862,500 $418,972 N=192
Total___________
For the purposes of this study, I use the proportion of
NYC/Global lawyers as a continuous variable to control, at least in
part, for the degree of firm concentration within the high-end,
noncommodity legal market. Obviously, this statistic is not a perfect
proxy for the systemic effects of geography on law firm operations
and strategy. 123 However, based on the regression results presented in
Part III, this variable is consistently one of the most important
variables in explaining the profitability of Am Law 200 law firms.
3. Firm Leverage
In the context of law firms, the term "leverage" refers to a very
specific concept: the extent to which partners, who own the firm,
maximize the firm's revenues (and presumably profits) by billing out
the time of lawyers who work for the firm as employees. Leverage is
often measured as the ratio of associates to partners, though other
122. See id. (presenting and analyzing geographic data on Am Law 200 law firms). The
Washington, D.C. MA was second, adding 4,916 lawyers. In contrast, MAs such as
Cleveland, Milwaukee, and Detroit, which all had a relatively large base of Am Law 200
lawyers in 1993, added fewer than 100 lawyers each by 2003.
123. The data necessary to completely control for type of legal work, such as a profit
margin for specific types of client matters and specific types of clients, is obviously not
available.
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methods of quantifying leverage are sometimes used.1 24 In a two-tier
partnership, however, it is unclear whether nonequity partners should
be classified as partners or associates, though one of the leading
consulting firms for legal services has concluded that "[nonequity
partners] can call themselves 'partner' and perhaps attend partner
meetings, but actually they are highly paid associates with a
percentage bonus interest."1 25 In addition, the proliferation of staff
attorneys1 26 and of counsel positions 127 has obscured the definition of
who should be classified as an associate.
In this study, the leverage variable was calculated by dividing the
total number of lawyers within a firm by the number of equity
partners.128 Under this definition, a firm can increase its leverage by
adding partners to a nonequity tier.129 The advantage of this method
is that it captures the economic rationale for leverage but avoids
making distinctions between various types of nonpartner lawyers.
Finally, the type and degree of leverage a firm can successfully
employ may vary with its relative standing in the marketplace. For
example, a less-prestigious Am Law 200 firm may find it difficult to
increase the ratio of associates to partners and simultaneously
maintain a traditional "up or out" promotion-to-partnership
124. Compare Associate Career Patterns, supra note 34, at 584 (defining leverage as
"the ratio of associates to partners") and Marc Galanter & Thomas Palay, The Large Law
Firm in Transition: An Historical Analysis, in LAW FIRM MANAGEMENT, supra note 35,
§ 8.4.4 (defining leverage as "the ratio of associates to partners"), with Giuliani,-supra note
33, at 28 (law firm consultant asserting that leverage is "often misconstrued to mean the
ratio of associates to partners. A better definition is the realizable value of associate hours
divided by the realizable value of partner hours.").
125. Success and Failure, supra note 35, § 7:19 n.9 (quoting ALTMAN WEIL, THE 1990
SUMMARY OF LAW FIRM ECONOMICS 62 (1990)); see also Frankel, supra note 12, at 95
("[Wihat does partnership mean when 'partners' don't share significantly in the firm's
good fortune or help determine its future? Is a nonequity partner at Kirkland any
different than a senior associate at Cravath?").
126. See, e.g., Galanter & Palay, supra note 124, § 8:32 (discussing growth in the
number of staff attorneys outside the partnership track who perform "low-end price
sensitive business").
127. See, e.g., ALTMAN WEIL, INC., COMPENSATION PLANS FOR LAW FIRMS 73
(James D. Cotterman ed., 4th ed. 2004) (noting proliferation of lawyer titles within large
law firms, "such as 'senior attorney,' 'special counsel, 'senior counsel,' or the elegantly
simple 'counsel.' ... [T]he lack of standardization of terminology leaves one at a loss to
divine precisely what a law firm means by making the distinction.").
128. The American Lawyer uses the same definition in its annual ranking of law firms.
See supra note 12.
129. Cf Alexander Stille, Turning to Two-Tier Partnerships, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 22, 1984,
at 1, 25 (noting that "many of the Chicago firms have been practicing their own version of
leverage for some time camouflaged by the two-tier system.... Kirkland & Ellis seems to
have a relatively low partner-associate ratio: of its 272 lawyers, 122 are partners and 150
are associates. But... only 58 partners are part-owners of the firm.").
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tournament. Obviously, highly qualified associates will tend to
migrate toward other firms where the difficulty and probability of
making partner are commensurate with the value of the promotion.
As a result, even though promotion to nonequity partner may be a
relatively expensive method of increasing firm leverage, it is likely
that at least some firms may have to make fairly liberal use of this
strategy in order to attract and retain high quality associates. In these
firms, the economic benefits of higher leverage may be positive but
ultimately relatively small.13°
4. Ratio of Nonequity to Equity Partners
The ratio of nonequity to equity partners (NE:E) is a continuous
variable that reveals the extent to which a two-tier partnership has
departed from the single-tier model. However, as a theoretical
matter, a large NE:E has the potential to both enhance and hinder
law firm profitability, and it is unclear which effect is likely to
predominate. For example, as discussed in Part II.B.3, a firm can
increase its leverage by adding nonequity partners. And presumably
leverage enhances a firm's profitability. In addition, restricting the
number of equity partners should, in theory, increase PPP by keeping
the denominator small.3 Further, a nonequity partnership track can
mitigate attrition that might otherwise reduce the quality of client
service."'
However, the existence of a nonequity partnership track also has
the potential to set in motion a system of incentives that undermines a
firm's long-term profitability. Specifically, the prestige and security
of nonequity partner status may be very attractive to highly
competent lawyers who would prefer to practice law rather than
develop clients. Notwithstanding their willingness to bill a large
number of hours, it is possible that "service partners" '133 are actually
making a contribution comparable to that of senior associates but are
130. Variations in leverage strategy based on relative market position may explain
some of the rather peculiar and counterintuitive statistics on the value of additional firm
leverage. See, e.g., Kellie Schmitt, Could Higher Leverage Mean Higher Profits?,
RECORDER, Nov. 22, 2005, at 1, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=
1133949910389 (citing examples of firms with similar levels of associate to partner leverage
but disparate levels of profitabilty).
131. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
132. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
133. ALTMAN WELL, INC., supra note 127, at 53 (describing the "archtypical service
partner [as] one who originates no business of his or her own [and] contributes to the
profits of the firm through personal labors on behalf of others' clients"); see also supra
note 73 and accompanying text (providing taxonomy on types of law firm partners).
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earning higher salaries. Further, the availability of a "service
partnership" track has the effect of reducing the incentives for client
development among both senior associates and nonequity partners.
Conversely, if management is too parsimonious in promoting lawyers
to equity partner, the firm can be beset by serious morale problems."'
As noted in Part I, one of the potential hazards of the two-tier system
is that it may permit management to delay or avoid difficult personnel
decisions. Over a period of time, it is possible that a deleterious self-
selection process takes hold and the two-tier firm ends up with an
associate pool with too few actual or potential rainmakers.
Obviously, this outcome would have a negative effect on law firm
profitability.135
As shown in Table 4, over the last decade, there has been a clear
trend toward two-tier partnerships, and the proportion of nonequity
to equity partners.
Table 4. Change in Proportion of Nonequity to Equity Partners
(NE:E), 1993 to 2003*
Mean 25th % Median 75th % Valid N
1993 NE:E 0.19 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.16 N=175
2003 NE:E 0.41 0.03 0.02 0.33 0.60 N=189
. Sources: Calculations made by the author from data drawn from the 2004 and
1994 National Law Journal 250.
5. Prestige Variables
This study utilizes two proxies for firm reputation. The first is
the Vault prestige score, which was derived from a 2002 electronic
survey of large law firm associates at 126 leading law firms. Since law
firm recruiting is affected by inclusion in the Vault 100,136 law firms
have a strong incentive to cooperate by disseminating the anonymous
survey instrument to their associates. Although Vault does not report
134. See, e.g., ALTMAN WELL, INC., supra note 127, at 26 ("[Our consulting
engagements have shown us that] when lawyers are placed permanently into special,
lower-prestige categories, morale problems invariably result over the years. Establishing a
lower class of partners as an intermediate step for a limited number of years is often
preferable.").
135. Cf. Wesemann, supra note 72 (observing that "some [two-tier] firms are finding
what is relatively painless in the short term can have devastating long-term
ramifications").
136. See generally Ciolli, supra note 105, at 417 (stating that "[m]any prospective and
current law students aspire" to obtain positions with Vault 100 firms).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
its response rate, more than 9,500 associates completed the survey.'3 7
Prestige is ranked on a one to ten scale with ten being the most
prestigious. Associates are asked only to rank the firms with which
they are familiar; in addition, they are not permitted to rank their
own firm. The Vault prestige variable is, therefore, probably a good
indicator of a firm's national prominence and, by extension, its ability
to attract high-end, price inelastic clients. One of the disadvantages
of the Vault 100, however, is that it is limited to only 100 firms.
The second measure of prestige is drawn from the 2004 Mid-
Level Survey.'38 Associates were asked to rate their own firm's
prestige on a scale of one to five, with five being the most prestigious.
The advantage of the Mid-Level prestige variable is twofold. First, it
provides a fairly direct measure of how valuable the associates
perceive the prize of partnership-and thus, the effort they might
exert in the promotion-to-partnership tournament. Second, the
correlation between the Vault and Mid-Level prestige variables is
0.70 (p < .000)139 and the Mid-Level prestige variable includes
approximately forty-five more observations than the Vault 100. Thus,
in some regression models, the Mid-Level prestige variable has both
theoretical and practical advantages.
III. RESULTS
Part III uses descriptive statistics and multivariate regression
analysis to examine and test several hypotheses related to single-tier
versus two-tier law firm partnerships. Section A compares single-tier
versus two-tier partnerships by market segment. Section B reviews
the data on firms switching to the two-tier format and uses logistic
regression to model the determinants of tier structure. Section C uses
linear regression to model and compare the determinants of
profitability in single-tier versus two-tier firms. Section D uses linear
regression to assess whether tier structure or the ratio of nonequity to
equity partners is related to changes in law firm profitability over
time.
137. GESSER ET AL., supra note 106, at 13.
138. See Mid-Levels Speak, supra note 97.
139. Presumably, some of the variation between the two variables is attributable to
associates' perception of their firm's prestige within a regional market. In contrast, the
ranking of 126 law firms in the Vault survey is more likely to reflect a national perspective.
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A. Comparison by Tier Structure and Market Segment
The descriptive statistics reveal significant differences between
single-tier versus two-tier law firms along three dimensions:
profitability, leverage, and prestige. However, the superior
profitability of single-tier firms appears to be primarily a function of
their reputational capital (and presumably the lawyers and clients the
firm attracts) rather than the tier structure per se. A careful review of
the data as presented in Tables 5, 6, and 7, shown together below,
corroborates this relationship.
Regarding profitability, it is clear that single-tier firms are
significantly more profitable than two-tier firms. Using an
independent sample t-test, the mean PPP of a single-tier firm
($1,048,690, n = 42) is statistically different (p = .001) from the mean
PPP of a two-tier firm ($684,557, n = 158). Moreover, even though
single-tier firms are disproportionately concentrated in New York
City,"4 which is the most lucrative legal market, this pattern of higher
profitability is visible when the data is broken down according to the
proportion of lawyers in New York and Global Cities (see Table 5).
In a partial correlation calculation, which controlled for the
proportion of lawyers in New York City, the negative relationship
between profitability and the two-tier structure is still statistically
significant (-.183, p = .011, n = 189).
One possible explanation for the higher profitability of single-tier
law firms is that they utilize higher leverage. However, single-tier
firms actually have lower leverage than two-tier firms. As shown in
Table 6, when leverage is broken down by the proportion of New
York City/Global Cities and tier status, it is surprising to observe that
the mean leverage is consistently higher in two-tier firms. In a partial
correlation calculation, which controlled for the proportion of lawyers
in New York City and leverage, the negative relationship between
profitability and the two-tier structure is even more pronounced
(-260, p < .000, n = 187).
140. See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 12, at 94 (reporting that "the most profitable New
York firms have resisted the temptation to establish second-tier partnerships, relying
instead on the willingness of associates to work at firms where they have little chance of
making partner" and that "[m]ore than half of the Am Law 100 firms with only one
partnership tier are based in New York").
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Table 5. PPP by Market Segment, Tier Structure
[Vol. 84
Market Segment Tier Mean S.E. of Std 1I Structure Mean Mean Deviation Vaid N
> 50% NYC Single-Tier $1,488,333 $142,694 $552,652 N=15
Global Two-Tier $1,109,474 $113,841 $496,222 N=19
10% to 50% NYC Single-Tier $882,778 $97,856 $293,568 N=9
/ Global Two-Tier $778,824 $44,782 $319,809 N=51
> 0% to 10% NYC Single-Tier $574,167 $75,381 $184,646 N=6
/ Global Two-Tier $534,324 $26,060 $158,518 N=37
No NYC / Global Single-Tier $578,333 $93,905 $281,714 N=9
Lawyers Two-Tier $474,783 $20,311 $137,756 N=46
Table 6. Firm Leverage by Tier Structure, Market Segment
Market Segment Tier Structure Mean S.E. of Std I Valid NMean Deviation
> 50% NYC / Single-Tier 4.04 0.22 0.85 N=15
Global Two-Tier 4.70 0.19 0.83 N= 19
10% to 50% Single-Tier 3.23 0.26 0.77 N=9
NYC / Global Two-Tier 3.91 0.15 1.08 N=51
> 0% to 10% Single-Tier 2.81 0.27 0.67 N=6
NYC / Global Two-Tier 3.41 0.11 0.68 N=36
No NYC / Global Single-Tier 2.20 0.33 1.00 N=9
Lawyers Two-Tier 2.88 0.11 0.75 N=46
Table 7. Firm Prestige (Vault, 1 to 10 Scale) by Tier Structure, Market
Segment
Market Segment Tier Structure Mean eSE. of Std Valid NI I Mean jDeviation
> 50% NYC / Single-Tier 7.353 0.344 1.239 N=13
Global Two-Tier 5.905 0.222 0.861 N=15
10% to 50% Single-Tier 6.509 0.298 0.842 N=8
NYC / Global Two-Tier 5.775 0.132 0.768 N=34
> 0% to 10% Single-Tier 5.696 0.415 0.720 N=3
NYC / Global Two-Tier 5.269 0.187 0.592 N=1O
No NYC / Global Single-Tier 5.898 0.509 1.019 N=4
Lawyers Two-Tier 5.156 0.181 0.479 N=7
A third significant distinction between single-tier and two-tier
firms is the large disparity in prestige. Consistent with Gilson's and
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Mnookin's theory that firms that adopt the "sharing model" can
flourish if they have sufficient reputational capital,14' single-tier firms
have much higher Vault prestige scores. Further, as shown in Table
7, this pattern is present in all market segments except for firms with
no presence in New York or Global Cities. 142
Yet, it appears that the superior profitability of single-tier firms
is probably attributable to superior prestige rather than incentives
that flow from the partnership structure. This result is evident from
the regression model summarized in Table 8, which used PPP as the
dependent variable and four independent variables: (1) tier structure;
(2) proportion of lawyers in New York and Global Cities; (3) firm
leverage; and (4) the prestige score from the Am Law Mid-Level
Survey. Tier structure has no statistically significant relationship to
firm profitability after controlling for market segment, leverage, and
prestige. Yet, as shown in Table 8, the remaining three variables
were all strongly predictive of PPP.
Table 8. OLS Regression Model, 2003 PPP is Dependent Variable
Variable B Std. Error Beta Sig.
(Constant) $863,908 $269,216 0.002
Two-Tier in 2003 $20,473 $69,698 0.019 0.769
Percent of Lawyers in NYC and $824,603 $93,142 0.590*** 0.000
Global Cities $46 $34 05* 00
Partner-Lawyer Leverage $89,486 $26,545 0.213*** 0.001
Mid-Level Prestige Score $272,959 $59,613 0.273** 0.000
Adj. R2  0.637
N 131
*** Significant at p = .001
B. Firms that Switched to Two-Tier Format
At first glance, the results in Section A present a puzzle: Why
are firms switching to a partnership structure that is clearly associated
with lower profitability and higher leverage? Gilson's and Mnookin's
discussion of reputational capital provides important insights.14' For
example, consider a single-tier law firm that is considering the
creation of a nonequity track. If the firm lacks sufficient reputational
capital, it is vulnerable to grabbing and leaving by its most productive
141. See supra Part I.A.
142. The distribution for the prestige score in the Mid-Level Survey is nearly identical
to the Vault variable presented in Table 7.
143. See supra Part I.A.
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partners. Further, because these "partners with power"14" have the
potential to destabilize the firm by actually carrying through on their
threat to leave, they can broker the adoption of the two-tier format,
which essentially institutionalizes the grabbing of their marginal
product to the firm. Service partners and technical specialists,
145
whose primary contribution is billing the requisite number of hours,
will be relegated to this tier, and their compensation will no longer be
based primarily on firm profits. 146
This hypothesis is corroborated by descriptive statistics in Table
9, which summarizes the differences in profitability and prestige
between law firms that remained single-tier or switched to two-tier
during the 1994 to 2003 observation period. An examination of the
mean and standard error suggest that the firms that switched to the
two-tier structure were (and are) significantly less profitable than the
firms that remained single-tier. 47 Similarly, the firms that switched
are also less prestigious than the firms that remained single-tier.
Although the prestige variables are from surveys taken in 2002 and
2003, it is likely that there was a similar prestige gap between these
firms a decade earlier. For example, there is a correlation coefficient
of 0.904 (p < .000) between the prestige scores of the fifty firms that
appeared on both the Vault 50 in 1998 and the Vault 100 in 2005. In
other words, prestige appears to be a very "sticky" variable.48
Patterns essentially identical to Table 9 are also present among Am
144. NELSON, supra note 37, at 5 (arguing that "the organizational rationalization of
the firm will be controlled by the partners with power," which is "inextricably tied to
'control of clients' ").
145. See supra Part I.C.
146. See, e.g., Blum, supra note 67, at 27 ("Instead of sharing in profits, nonequity
partners are paid like senior associates, with a guaranteed base salary .... ); James W.
Jones, When Is a Partner Not a Partner?, N.J. L.J., June 9, 1997, at 35 (law firm consultant
and former managing partner of Arnold & Porter observing the trend toward "multi-
tiered partnerships, sometimes involving nonequity partners, contract partners, or others
whose compensation is not really tied to the earnings of the firm."); Nonequity
Partnership; No Vote, No Profits, No Liability, TEX. LAW., July 7, 1997, at 26 (noting that
nonequity partnerships "are salaried positions generally").
147. The range created by adding or subtracting an amount equal to 1.96 standard
errors creates a confidence interval in which there is 95% likelihood that the parameter's
true mean falls within that range. See CHRISTOPHER H. ACHEN, INTERPRETING AND
USING REGRESSION 41-42 (1982). Therefore, when the mean for firms that remained
single-tier fall outside the confidence interval created by the mean and standard error of
the firms that switched to two-tier, as is the case for all variables in Table 9, we can
conclude the two populations are statistically different along that dimension (i.e.,
profitability or prestige).
148. See, e.g., Profit Sharing, supra note 34, at 388 (asserting that "it is easier to retain
firm-specific capital than to create it").
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Law 200 firms that remained single-tier or converted to two-tier
between 1998 and 2003.
Table 9. Profitability and Prestige of Firms that Remained Single Tier,
or Switched to Two-Tier, 1994-2003
Variable Status Mean [Mee
2003 PPP Stayed Single-Tier $1,226,250 $116,667 $571,551 N=24
Changed to two-Tier $906,200 $52,918 $264,592 N=25
1994 Stayed Single-Tier $657,292 $62,361 $305,504 N=24
Changed to two-Tier $409,200 $23,485 $117,426 N=25
Vault
Prestige Stayed Single-Tier 6.95 0.235 1.153 N=24Score(1-10) Changed to two-Tier 6.07 0.158 0.706 N=20
Mid-Level Stayed Single-Tier 4.62 0.071 0.316 N=20
Prestige
(1-5) Changed to two-Tier T 4.03 0.080 0.401 N=25
Presumably, most firms began as single-tier before making the
decision to adopt the two-tier structure. 49 It is reasonable to assume
that the decision to switch was influenced by a desire to either protect
or grow the profits for the group of lawyers who would be placed in
the equity tier. 5° Therefore, I constructed a logistic regression model
to predict the probability that a firm is single- or two-tier.' The
model included four independent variables that should, in theory, be
relevant to the decision to create a nonequity partnership tier: (1) law
firm size, because larger law firms make it more difficult to monitor
shirking by unproductive partners;'52 (2) profits per partner, because
smaller profits create greater pressure to place less productive
149. See ALTMAN & WEIL, INC., supra note 9, at 11-12 (reviewing survey results of
two-tier status among law firms and observing, "The correlation to firm size is
unmistakable. While class distinctions within partnerships are still uncommon among
small- and medium-sized firms, they are becoming quite the trend among large law
firms.").
150. See, e.g., supra note 84 and accompanying text.
151. Logistic regression is used to predict the likelihood of a single dichotomous
outcome (e.g., single versus two-tier partnership structure). See generally FRED C.
PAMPEL, LOGISTIC REGRESSION: A PRIMER (2000) (discussing appropriate applications
of this methodology).
152. See, e.g., Law Firm Profitability, supra note 35, at 205 (noting that "[p]artners may
be less subject to peer pressure in large firms and these organizations may, thus, have a
more difficult time identifying and controlling partners who shirk"); see also Ribstein,
supra note 5, at 1720 (noting that "it may be harder to police shirking in larger firms").
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partners in a nonequity tier;153 (3) proportion of lawyers in New York
City, because some have suggested that the city's larger concentration
of single-tier firms is related to cultural norms;'54 and (4) prestige,
because lack of reputational capital makes a firm more vulnerable to
grabbing and leaving, and a two-tier structure can be used to
formalize the marginal product approach. 55
The results of this model are summarized in Table 10. Three of
the variables are statistically significant at the conventional .05 level:
2003 PPP, percentage of lawyers in New York City, and firm prestige.
Surprisingly, higher PPP is associated with a greater likelihood of
having a two-tier structure. Some methodologists, however,
recommend the Baysian information criterion ("BIC") as a more
rigorous test for significance in a logistic regression model.'56 The
BIC is calculated by subtracting the natural log of the sample size
from the Wald statistic.157 A BIC greater than zero is presumed to be
evidence of a significant relationship; a value of 0 to 2 is weak, 6 to 10
is strong, and greater than 10 is very strong.15 8 Applying this method
of evaluation to the results in Table 10, the relationship between tier
structure and profitability is not significant. In addition, firm prestige
153. See, e.g., supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text. The specifications for the
models summarized in Table 8 and Table 10, in which PPP and tier structure are
alternatively dependent and independent variables, implicitly contemplate a possible
endogenous relationship between PPP and tier structure-i.e., that causality may run in
both directions. However, in the OLS model summarized in Table 8, it was shown that
tier structure is not associated with PPP after controlling for leverage, prestige, and
market segment. I further tested for the possibility of an endogenous relationship by
regressing tier structure onto all the independent variables in Table 8. The resulting error
term from this equation was uncorrelated with PPP after controlling for tier structure,
leverage, prestige, and market segment. For a summary of this test for endogeneity, see
JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCrORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN APPROACH
507 (2d ed. 2003).
154. See, e.g., supra note 68; see also Frankel, supra note 12, at 94 (noting that in the
Am Law 100 2004 rankings of profits per partner, "it is still the New York firms that
remain holdouts with regard to tiered partnerships"); Thom Weidlich, No-Share Partners
on Rise, NAT'L L. J., Oct. 25, 1993, at 1 (suggesting that "the two-tier setup has been more
popular in the Midwest than on either coast" and that tradition "almost assures against it[s
use] in New York").
155. See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
156. See PAMPEL, supra note 151, at 31, 35-36 (citing A.E. Raftery, Bayesian Model
Selection in Social Research, in SOCIOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY 139 (P.V. Marsden, ed.,
1995)).
157. The Wald statistic is calculated by squaring the ratio of the coefficient (B) and the
standard error (S.E.). See id. at 35. In this model, the natural log of sample size (n =132)
equals 4.883.
158. Id. at 31 (summarizing Raftery's rule of thumb for interpreting results and noting
that "the BIC test of significance for a coefficient provides more information than
traditional significance tests" and that it is "especially helpful to logistical regression").
2006] SINGLE-TIER VERSUS TWO-TIER PARTNERSHIPS 1733
emerges as the most important predictor variable in the model.
Interpreting the exponentiated coefficient (Exp(B)), an increase of
one prestige point on the Mid-Level prestige score is associated with
a 98.4 percent reduction in odds of being a two-tier firm (1- 0.016 =
0.984), after controlling for firm size, profits per partner, and
proportion of lawyers in New York City. 59  When the same
regression model is run using the Vault prestige score, the prestige
score once again emerges as the only variable with predictive power
(Exp (B) = .157, p < .000, BIC = 10.057); the BIC values for the
remaining three independent variables were all less than zero. 16°
Table 10. Logistic Regression Model, Predicting 2003 Tier Structure
Variable B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) J BIC
Constant 17.966 3.805 22.293 0.000 63,440,753
Firm Size 0.000 0.001 0.265 0.607 1.000 -.416
2003 PPP 0.264 0.132 3.999 0.046 1.302 -.883
% of
Lawyers in -5.410** 1.780 9.232 0.002 0.004** 4.39
NYC
Mid-Level
Prestige -4.111*** 0.983 17.489 0.000 0.016*** 12.61
Score
Pseudo R2  0.429
N 132
*Significant at p= .05 *Significant at p= .001
In summary, the lack of reputational capital in a firm's relevant
market appears to be a key factor in the decision to adopt a two-tier
structure. Insofar as reputational capital becomes less important in
the market for high-end legal services (because more corporate
clients obtain a better value by shopping for lawyers rather than
159. For a primer on how to interpret coefficients of a logistic regression, see PAMPEL,
supra note 151, at 18-39.
160. The sample size for this model was 94. The pseudo R2 was .376. Pseudo R2 is a
measure of fit for a logistic regression model that roughly corresponds to the R2 statistic
used in linear regression. A value of zero means that the logistic model has no explanatory
power for explaining the variance of the dependent variable; a value approaching one
reflects a very accurate model. See id. at 48-54 (noting that "the dependent variable in
logistic regression [which is binary] does not have variance in the same way continuous
variables do in regression," and that "maximum likelihood procedures provide model fit
measures [such as pseudo R2 that are] analogous to those from least squared regression[;]"
noting lack of consensus on best measures of fit for logistic regression models but that
"measures of goodness of fit that vary from 0 to 1 can be helpful").
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firms), it appears that the trend toward two-tier partnerships will
continue to ebb forward.
C. Determinants of Profitability in Single Versus Two-Tier Firms
As discussed in Sections A and B, single-tier firms tend to be
more profitable, less leveraged, and more prestigious than two-tier
firms. Further, because single-tier firms enjoy higher indices of
reputational capital, they are presumably in a better position to
attract and retain large, price inelastic clients who are loyal to the
firm.161 Yet, these same attributes suggest that single-tier firms may
have a competitive advantage in the market for entry-level associates.
Further, assuming that a significant number of firm associates are
truly engaged in a promotion-to-partnership tournament,162 single-tier
partnerships generally offer a larger prize of equity partnership in a
highly prestigious and profitable law firm. Therefore, it is possible
that single-tier firms are generally better positioned to attract more
talented and harder working associates than their two-tier
counterparts. Alternatively, an established nonequity track for
service partners in a two-tier firm may be attractive to talented
lawyers who want the title of partner but may lack the ability or
desire to engage in business development. In essence, a two-tier
partnership can be cast as a tournament with a higher probability of
obtaining a smaller, but perhaps more desirable, prize-nonequity
partner.
In fact, the statistics on hours billed per week and attrition
suggest significant differences between single-tier and two-tier firms.
For example, as shown in Table 11, associates in single-tier firms
billed on average 1.8 hours more per week than associates in two-tier
firms. Using an independent sample t-test, I confirmed that these
means were significantly different (p = .029). Similarly, associates in
two-tier firms reported that they were more likely to remain with the
161. Cf. Profit Sharing, supra note 34, at 357-58 & n.73 (hypothesizing that firms with a
sharing approach are more likely to have longstanding ties to large institutional clients,
such as banks, that bring in a steady and predictable flow of work).
162. Compare GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 1, at 100-02 (discussing existence and
incentive effects of the promotion-to-partnership tournament), with Kevin A. Kordana,
Law Firms and Associate Careers: Tournament Theory Versus the Production-Imperative
Model, 104 YALE L.J. 1907, 1923-33 (1995) (arguing that associates are attracted to large
firms for a combination of high pay and the development of general human capital skills
rather than the opportunity to become a partner). The most recent Am Law Mid-Level
Associate Survey contains clear evidence that at least some associates are very interested
in their partnership prospects. See Amy Kolz, Can You Hear Me Now?, AM. LAW., Oct.
2005, at 104 (reporting that associates' score on "communication regarding partnership
prospects" was the lowest among the twelve categories of associate satisfaction).
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firm for the next two years; this difference was also highly statistically
significant (p = .005). In other words, the dynamics of the promotion-
to-partnership tournament appear to be different depending upon tier
structure: associates in single-tier firms are working harder while
associates in two-tier firms are more content with their jobs.16 3
Table 11. Hours Billed, Attrition, 2004 Am Law Associate Survey
Variable Tier Structure Mean S Std.Dev. NII IMean I St.Dv I
Average Hours Billed Single-Tier 46.32 0.772 4.09 N=28
per Week Two-Tier 44.47 0.241 2.48 N=106
Likelihood of Staying Single-Tier 3.34 0.085 0.45 N=28
Two Years Score Two-Tier 3.61 0.042 0.43 N= 105
To explore the possibility that differences in the partnership
tournament in single-tier versus two-tier firms lead to differences in
the underlying determinants of firm profitability, I specified a linear
regression model with profits per partner as the dependent variable
and five independent variables related to firm profitability: (1)
proportion of lawyers in New York and Global Cities; (2) leverage;
(3) prestige; (4) average associate hours billed per week; and (5)
likelihood that associate will be with the firm for at least two years. 164
The first three factors were included in the regression model
summarized in Table 8. The fourth factor, average hours billed per
week, is presumably associated with higher firm profits. The
theoretical relationship between profitability and the fifth factor,
likelihood that an associate will remain with the firm during the next
two years, is more ambiguous. For example, low scores on this
variable could be associated with excessive lawyer attrition that could
163. Although it is tempting to impute dissatisfaction or unhappiness to associates in
single-tier firms, another possibility is that associates in single-tier firms have more
attractive outplacement options. Cf. Associate Career Patterns, supra note 34, at 581-86
(suggesting that highly leveraged and prosperous partnerships in New York City may be
able to sustain the traditional out-or-out partnership model because the outplacement
prospects from these firms may be significantly above average).
164. Using 1993 Am Law 100 data, Chadwick and Hanna found that law firm size was a
relevant determinant of law firm profitability after controlling for number of branch
offices. See Chadwick & Hanna, supra note 55, at 63. Therefore, in another regression
model, I included all the variables in Table 12 plus the number of lawyers and the number
branch offices. However, firm size had no statistically significant relationship with
profitability while number of offices was associated with lower PPP. The remaining
variables in the model remained statistically significant, and overall, the model that
included firm size and branch offices was not a better predictor of firm profitability. In the
interests of brevity, that expanded model is omitted.
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adversely affect client service.1 65 Alternatively, a high score may be
partially a function of a liberal promotion to nonequity partner and
the lack of better employment options. 66 From the perspective of
firm management, this attrition variable should have either a positive
relationship or no relationship with firm profits, after controlling for
the other four variables.
Table 12. OLS Regression Model, Dependent Variable is 2003 PPP
Variable B Std. Error Beta Sig.
(Constant) -$1,451,438 $447,735 0.002
% Lawyers in NYC / Global Cities $450,735 $91,096 0.322*** 0.000
Calculated Leverage 2003 $56,742 $22,486 0.135* 0.013
Mid-Level Prestige Score $204,553 $51,484 0.204*** 0.000
Average Hours Billed per Week $42,667 $9,348 0.290*** 0.000
Likelihood of Staying Two Years -$229,218 $57,464 -0.235*** 0.000
N 131
Adj. R2  0.732
* Significant at p = .05 Significant at p = .001
As shown in Table 12, all five factors appear to be determinants
of firm profitability. Further, the model explains more than 73% of
the variance between firms. However, the variable for the likelihood
that an associate will remain at the firm for two years has a negative
relationship with firm profitability. In other words, the more secure
or content an associate feels in his or her job, the less profitable it is
for the firm, after controlling for market segment, leverage, firm
prestige, and hours billed.
To determine whether this pattern was more predominant in
two-tier law firms (because, for example, these firms were attracting a
disproportionate number of lawyers interested in the service partner
track), I ran the same regression model separately for single-tier and
two-tier firms. The results, which are summarized in Table 13,
suggest at least three significant distinctions between single- and two-
tier law firms in the Am Law 200 marketplace. First, there is a
negative relationship in two-tier firms between profitability and the
165. See, e.g., supra note 85 and accompanying text (discussing how a nonequity tier
can be used to ensure client continuity).
166. See supra note 163.
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likelihood that an associate will stay two years (p = .001); in contrast,
this relationship is not statistically significant for single-tier firms.
Second, the financial benefits of leverage appear to be more
pronounced in single-tier firms; one unit of leverage is associated with
an additional $136,941 in profits per partner, versus $38,804 in a two-
tier firm. As noted earlier, because of competitive labor markets for
high quality associates, the creation or expansion of a nonequity
partnership track may be the only feasible way to increase leverage. 167
Although it may be more expensive than running an up-or-out
tournament with more associates, it is noteworthy that higher
leverage is, nonetheless, associated with higher profits. Third, the
reputational capital appears to be more valuable in single-tier firms;
one unit of prestige (on a one to five scale) is worth approximately
$358,000, versus $168,000 in a two-tier firm. This finding is consistent
with the Gilson and Mnookin framework. 168
167. See supra Part II.B.2.
168. See supra Part I.A.
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Table 13. OLS Regression Model, Dependent Variable is 2003 PPP, by
Tier Status
MODEL FOR SINGLE TIER
Variables B Std. Error Beta Sig.
(Constant) -$2,184,240 $1,202,017 0.083
% Lawyers in NYC / Global Cities $386,536 $151,147 0.282* 0.018
Calculated Leverage 2003 $135,941 $64,138 0.247* 0.046
Mid-Level Prestige Score $357,719 $98,783 0.306** 0.002
Average Hours Billed per Week $33,136 $17,316 0.249 0.069
Likelihood of Staying Two Years -$165,173 $154,340 -0.138 0.430
N 27
Adj. R2  0.863
MODEL FOR Two-TIER
Variables B Std. Error Beta Sig.
(Constant) -$1,558,069 $522,552 0.004
% Lawyers in NYC / Global Cities $436,896 $127,409 0.301 0.001
Calculated Leverage 2003 $38,804 $26,189 0.108 0.142
Mid-Level Prestige Score $167,528 $70,361 0.163* 0.019
Average Hours Billed per Week $50,965 $12,061 0.331"** 0.000
Likelihood of Staying Two Years -$240,341 $67,731 -0.273*** 0.001
N 104
Adj. R2 0.633
* Significant at p = .05 ** Significant at p = .01 *** Significant at p = .001
Overall, the separation of the sample by tier structure also
produced a better fitting model for single-tier firms.169 Although the
sample size is relatively small (N = 27), the model explains over 86%
of the variance in profitability among single-tier firms. In contrast,
169. Here, I am commenting on how the goodness-of-fit measure (adjusted R2) is
higher in the model run on the single-tier firm (Table 13) versus all firms combined (Table
12). If tier status were irrelevant to law firm profitability, the reduction in the sample size
would ordinarily lead to a diminution (or no change) rather than an increase in this
statistic.
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the model is a less robust predictor in two-tier firms, explaining
approximately 63% of the variance in firm profits. This divergence
suggests that single-tier firms may be more homogenous (e.g., more
elite) in their client base and/or the caliber of lawyers they attract to
the firm. Conversely, the greater heterogeneity among two-tier firms
suggests a potentially larger role for effective (or ineffective)
management or incentive systems as determinants of law firm
profits. 7 ' This last observation is certainly good news to law firm
consultants.
D. Tier Structure and Changes in Profitability over Time
Section D explores a simple but important question of law firm
strategy: Is switching to the two-tier format associated with higher
increases in law firm profitability over time? To test this hypothesis, I
specified a regression model with the increase in profits per partner
between 1994 and 2003 as the dependent variable and four
independent variables: (1) the proportion of lawyers in New York
and Global Cities in 1993;171 (2) change in the proportion of lawyers
in New York and Global Cities between 1993 and 2003; (3) profits per
partner in 1994; and (4) a dummy variable for whether a firm
remained single-tier or switched to two-tier during the observation
period.
Table 14. OLS Regression Model, Change in PPP
between 1994 and 2003
Variables B Std. Error Beta Sig.
(Constant) $81,366 $87,056 0.355
Percent of Lawyers in NYC, Global 1993 $362,430 $103,165 0.532*** 0.001
Chg in % NYC, Global, 1993-2003 $782,727 $356,243 0.244* 0.033
1994 PPP $0.44 $0.15 0.452* 0.005
Changed to Two-Tier, 1994 to 2003 $90,123 $55,063 0.181 0.109
N 49
Adj. R2  0.563
Significant at p = .05 *** Significant at p = .001
170. The heterogeneity of two-tier law firms is the topic of Part IV.B, infra.
171. Because the dependent variable is change in PPP between 1994 (the first year that
The American Lawyer reported tier status) and 2003, it would be ideal to use a locational
variable based on 1994 data. Unfortunately, the dataset only includes locational data for
1993 and 2003. The difference, however, is presumably negligible.
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The results, which are summarized in Table 14, reveal a modest
relationship between switching to the two-tier format and higher law
firm profitability. This relationship, however, does not satisfy the
conventional .05 or .10 threshold for statistical significance.
Therefore, it remains unclear whether switching to a two-tier format
is an effective strategy for increasing law firm profitability. One
possibility is that the sample contains both effective and ineffective
implementations of the two-tier structure, which would result in
positive and negative effects on profitability that offset one another.
An alternative strategic advantage of the two-tier structure may
be its ability to increase the proportion of nonequity to equity
partners, thus tempering the growth of the denominator in the PPP
calculation."i To test this hypothesis, I specified a similar regression
equation with the increase in profits per partner between 1994 and
2003 as the dependent variable and four independent variables: (1)
the proportion of lawyers in New York and Global Cities in 1993; (2)
change in the proportion of lawyers in New York and Global Cities
between 1993 and 2003; (3) profits per partner in 1993; and (4) change
in the ratio of nonequity to equity partners (NE:E) between 1993 and
2003.173
Table 15. OLS Regression Model, Change in PPP
between 1994 and 2003
Variables B Std. Error ] Beta J Sig.
(Constant) $123,058 $52,415 0.021
Percent of Lawyers in NYC, Global $480,945 $88,442 0.612*** 0.000
1993 $40,4_$8,4 0.612*** 0.000
Chg in % NYC, Global, 1993-2003 $1,246,622 $253,650 0.421** 0.000
1993 PPP $0.320 $0.121 0.274** 0.010
Change in NE:E, 1993 to 2003 $117,102 $58,632 0.153* 0.049
N 86
Adj. R2  0.527
* Significant at p = .05 ** Significant at p = .01 *** Significant at p = .001
172. See, e.g., Blum, supra note 67 ("It's simple mathematics. Remove from the total a
firm's more junior partners-who tend to take home a smaller piece of the pie-and the
average will jump.").
173. In the case of a single-tier firm, NE:E is obviously equal to zero. See supra Part
II.B.4.
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The results, which are summarized in Table 15, suggest that
increasing the size of the nonequity tier is associated with an increase
in profits per partner. Specifically, even after controlling for market
segment, change in market segment, and initial profitability, we
would expect an increase in the ratio of nonequity to equity partners
of one unit (e.g., from 0 to 1 NE:E, or 0.5 to 1.5 NE:E) over the ten-
year observation period to result in an increase in profits per partner
of approximately $117,000. However, the average increase in NE:E
between 1993 and 2003 is relatively small: 0.239 units, with a standard
deviation of 0.453.174 Thus, for most firms, this strategy would not be
expected to produce large gains in profits per partner. Overall, initial
profitability and a firm's foothold and growth in New York and
Global Cities appear to be more robust predictors of increased
profitability. Further, successful, large-scale expansion of the
nonequity tier may depend on other factors not controlled for, such as
a firm's prestige. 75
In summary, there is little empirical evidence that either
switching to the two-tier model or expanding the relative size of the
nonequity partnership track produces significant financial benefits for
a firm's equity partners. If this is true, it raises the question of why
the Am Law 200 marketplace has steadily migrated to the two-tier
format.176 Certainly one plausible answer is law firm stability.77
Specifically, the exit of key partners can often operate as a catalyst for
the breakup of the firm. 178 To forestall such an outcome, the two-tier
structure can be used as a mechanism to bond the firm to the
marginal product approach, thus funneling more income (and,
perhaps more importantly, managerial control) to the firm's most
powerful partners. In addition, the distribution of income within the
equity tier may be skewed toward the partners with the most
significant books of business. Therefore, returning to the Gilson and
174. See supra Table 1.
175. It is perhaps telling that Kirkland & Ellis, a highly prestigious two-tier firm, was
one of the most aggressive in the expansion of its nonequity tier. Kirkland's increase in
PPP between 1993 and 2003 was $1.2 million, which is the fourth highest in the sample.
176. For a summary of the number of firms that have switched to the two-tier format,
see supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text.
177. See supra text accompanying note 87 (discussing how two-tier structure might be
utilized as a method to mitigate the potential for defections that could destabilize the
firm).
178. See, e.g., WILLIAM G. JOHNSTON, ANATOMY OF LAW FIRM FAILURES: A LOOK
AT US LAW FIRM DISSOLUTIONS FROM 1998-2004, at 14-16 & Exhibit A (2004)
(reporting that partner defections were catalysts in numerous large law firm dissolutions
between 1998 and 2004), available at http://www.hilderbrandt.com/PublicDocs/DOCID
1739_492004850218.pdf.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Mnookin framework, we might expect greater variations in profit
distributions in two-tier firms, which are associated with the marginal
product approach, versus single-tier firms, which more closely track
the sharing model. 179
IV. DISCUSSION
This final Part covers two topics. Section A outlines a unified
theory on the adoption and operation of single-tier versus two-tier
partnerships in the Am Law 200 marketplace. Section B concludes
with some preliminary observations that two-tier partnership
structures are much more diverse than the coding system used in this
study suggests. Therefore, careful qualitative examinations of
successful two-tier firms may provide important information on what
formats provide effective incentives for both partners and associates.
A. A Theory of Single-Tier Versus Two-Tier Law Firms
The findings set forth in Part III of this study suggest that the
movement toward the two-tier model, which is ostensibly driven by a
pursuit of higher profits per partner, may be substantially influenced
by a firm's relative standing in the marketplace. Specifically, tier
structure appears to be a function of a firm's reputational capital.18 °
Further, large disparities between single-tier and two-tier firms
suggest that they are organized and operate under significantly
different rules and constraints.
Single-tier firms, for example, are more likely to have a larger
base of lucrative clients with longstanding ties to the firm; thus,
partners lack the incentive (and possibly the ability) to obtain higher
compensation through grabbing or leaving.18' Insofar as the single-
tier structure reflects a commitment to share both the risks and
rewards of the partnership, single-tier firms allocate work to the most
cost-effective associates and partners without squabbles over business
origination credits.'82 In the long run, this internal dynamic further
solidifies the firm's reputation for high quality service. 183 The higher
179. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
180. See supra Part III.B.
181. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text (discussing benefits of firm-specific
capital, such as reputation); see also supra Tables 5-8 and accompanying text (descriptive
statistics and regression results showing strong relationship between prestige and law firm
profitability).
182. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text (discussing perverse incentives that
can affect the performance of firms using the marginal product approach).
183. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text (discussing how lack of sharing
within a firm can undermine quality and efficiency of work product).
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profitability and prestige of single-tier firms also has significant
effects on recruitment, attracting top graduates of the nation's leading
law schools who are willing to work longer hours to attain the prize of
equity partnership."8 The caliber of associates the firm attracts, in
combination with strict partnership admission standards, mitigates the
risk of shirking. Finally, the halo of the firm's prestige also benefits
the lawyers who are vanquished in the partnership tournament,
supplying them with excellent outplacement options as a consolation
prize."'
In contrast, single-tier firms with low indices of prestige appear
destined to become two-tier firms.'86 The firm's most lucrative clients
are primarily drawn to the firm based on the reputation and service of
individual lawyers. This rainmaking class of partners is loathe to
share firm profits with their less productive counterparts. Unless
these "partners with power" are rewarded at their marginal product,
there is a substantial risk that they will leave the firm and their clients
will follow. 87 As the profit pie shrinks, other members have an
incentive to defect, thus threatening the very survival of the firm.188
Thus, a less prestigious firm bonds itself to the marginal product
approach by adopting a two-tier (or multi-tier) partnership structure.
Long-term control of the firm, including the division of profits, is thus
given to the lawyers who are qualified, by dint of their marginal
product, for the equity tier. 189
Yet, this study's empirical findings suggest that the two-tier
structure raises other difficult incentive problems. For example, a
two-tier firm will allocate a large percentage of its profits to powerful
184. See supra Part III.C.
185. See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text (suggesting that outplacement
options might be better in single-tier versus two-tier firms).
186. See supra Part III.B.
187. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text (theorizing about why firms are
switching to a partnership structure associated with lower PPP).
188. See supra note 178 and accompanying text (discussing how departures of key
partners can lead to the collapse of a firm); see also Heidi Moore, Testa Hurwitz To
Disband, DAILY DEAL, Jan. 17, 2005 (reporting that 280 lawyer Am Law 200 firm voted
to disband "after failing to find a merger partner following ten major partner defections in
[the previous month]"). Testa Hurwitz was included in the dataset used in this study; they
are categorized by The American Lawyer as a single-tier firm.
189. As one law firm consultant has observed, "When the voting control is in the hands
of those [partners] who don't drive its economic growth, you put the firm at risk of a move
toward mediocrity." Meaning of Partnership, supra note 53, at 8 (quoting Ward Bower of
Altman Weil, Inc.); see also Stille, supra note 129 (observing, in 1984, that the movement
toward the two-tier system is "to toughen partnership standards; to reward stars and cut
dead wood; to centralize power in the firm and to retain valued specialists but separate
them from the select few who actually run the firm").
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and mobile rainmaker partners and limit the class of new equity
partners. But to mitigate attrition costs in order to maintain (or
build) client loyalty to the firm, it must construct a partnership
tournament that is attractive to highly capable new lawyers. The
smaller prize of nonequity partnership warrants less sacrifice by
young associates and makes high billable hour requirements (or
expectations) more difficult to enforce.19° Yet, the lower economic
value of nonequity partnership is counterbalanced by the more liberal
promotion standards to the nonequity tier and the psychic benefits of
making partner; to the outside world, no distinction is made between
equity and nonequity status."' Indeed, from the perspective of young
associates, nonequity partners may appear to have struck the best
balance between professional and personal success.192 Thus, two-tier
firms run the risk of creating a deleterious self-selection dynamic if
the firm attracts a disproportionate number of associates who are
content to settle for service partner status. The difficulty of creating a
proper incentive system might explain the mixed financial
performance of single-tier firms that switch to the two-tier format.193
B. Heterogeneous Incentive Structures in Two- Tier Firms
All of the significant findings in this study depend upon a
relatively crude dichotomous variable: single-tier versus two-tier (or
multi-tier) partnership structure as defined by The American Lawyer
magazine. 194 The principal theoretical framework has relied upon tier
structure as a proxy for two ends of a continuum. Single-tier firms
represent one pole and presumably hew closer to Gilson's and
Mnookin's sharing model, lockstep compensation, and a larger
tournament prize of equity partnership. At the other end are two-tier
firms, which track, albeit imperfectly, the marginal product approach,
eat-what-you-kill compensation, and a higher probability of winning a
190. See supra Part III.C.
191. See supra note 44; see also Fleury, supra note 78, at 1 (noting that law firms "want
the line [between equity and nonequity tiers] to be transparent to the outside world");
Kenneth M. Hildebrandt, What To Do if the Business Climate Continues To Slow, ACCr.
L. FIRMS, June 2001, available at http://www.westlaw.com (law firm consultant noting that
one of the advantages of nonequity status is that lawyers "can forgo the risks and rewards
of associated with ownership, but would still be viewed by the outside world as a
partner").
192. See sources cited supra notes 77-78 (referring to nonequity status as a "lifestyle
choice" for "good lawyers [who] don't want to sacrifice their personal lives in order to
make [equity] partner").
193. See supra Part III.D.
194. See supra Part II.B.1
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less valuable prize. 95 As it turns out, this simple tier variable has
significant explanatory power. Yet, it would be a mistake to rely on
this study to draw any broad conclusions on what is the "best"
partnership structure.
This cautionary note applies with special force to two-tier
partnerships. Although the regression models for law firm
profitability in Part III generally had impressive predictive power, the
unexplained variance for two-tier firms was 36.7% versus only 13.7%
for single-tier firms.' 96 This large disparity suggests that two-tier law
firms are probably much more heterogeneous than single-tier firms.
In fact, this study's blunt coding method masks a wide variety of tier
formats meant to embody dramatically different incentive structures
for both associates and partners.197 Further, the large quantity of
reputational capital in most single-tier firms is presumably much
more forgiving of firm mismanagement. In contrast, to hold the firm
together, managing partners at non-prestigious two-tier firms need to
reward star performers at their marginal product while
simultaneously motivating young lawyers, without the lure of equity
partnership, to stay at the firm and work long hours.
Probably the best way to understand how a law firm manager can
thread this very narrow needle is to conduct a detailed qualitative
examination of the different types of two-tier law firms. To illustrate
this point, consider some similarities and differences between two
prominent two-tier firms based in Chicago, 198 Winston & Strawn and
Kirkland & Ellis, which are summarized in Table 16. Both firms have
leverage in the top quartile of Am Law 200 firms."9 In addition, both
firms have high ratios of nonequity to equity partners that place them
195. See, e.g., Terry Carter, A Delicate Balance: Law Firms Seek Ways To Please the
Superstars Without Demoralizing Others, A.B.A. J., Mar. 2005, at 28 (commenting that
"[i]mplicit" in the movement toward two-tier partnerships "is some emphasis on eat-what-
you-kill").
196. See supra Table 13.
197. Unfortunately, this information is not readily collectible. Large law firms do not
divulge the inner-workings of their equity and nonequity tiers-though it is remarkable
how much about their firms they are willing to provide to the legal press. Apparently,
firms fear that a negative inference will be drawn if they fail to cooperate.
198. Chicago has actually been referred to as the "land of the two-tier partnerships"
because of its early adoption by many of the city's leading firms. See Cindy Collins,
Anchoring Associates: Akin Gump Creates Intermediate Fast-Track Step to Partnership,
OF COUNSEL, Nov. 2, 1998, at 17.
199. Leverage is defined as a firm's total number of lawyers divided by number of
equity partners. See supra note 22.
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in the top 10% nationally. 0 Further, both firms are leaders in the
disparities between the average compensation of nonequity and
equity partners.21  However, this gap is much more pronounced at
Kirkland & Ellis because of its towering profits per partner
($1,900,000), which is the fourth highest in this study.
Table 16. Comparison of Two Large Chicago Law Firms
Firm Total Lawyers Leverage NE:E 2003 PPP pAv . NE
Kirkland & Ellis 805 4.40 1.06 $1,900,000 $400,000
Winston & 854 5.44 1.20 $815,000 $305,000
Strawn
Yet, the large profits per partner differentials may be strongly
influenced by differences in the firms' two-tier partnership structures.
For example, Winston & Strawn appears to operate a two-tier model
in which the nonequity partnership track can be a permanent position
within the firm.20 2 Over the years, the structure has drawn criticism
from within the firm. In 1995, when the firm's profitability began to
slide, Winston & Strawn's managing partner openly questioned
whether the firm had been "too generous in handing out nonequity
partnerships in the first place. 2 3
The following year, the American Lawyer Mid-Level Associates
Survey gave the firm low marks for a high billable hours requirement
and overall associate satisfaction.2" According to one Winston &
Strawn associate, "Long hours with average pay have resulted in
200. See Fixed Income Devotees, AM. LAW., July 2004, at 95 (listing the seven firms in
the Am Law 100 in 2004 that had more nonequity than equity partners, including Kirkland
& Ellis, ranked third, and Winston & Strawn, ranked seventh).
201. See A Pay Differential, AM. LAW., July 2004, at 95 (showing in table format the
PPP and average compensation for nonequity partners for the seven firms in the Am Law
100 with the largest proportion of nonequity to equity partners).
202. See HEINTZ & MARKHAM-BUGBEE, supra note 8, at 33-41 (describing
characteristics of this type of two-tier firm and designating it as Model B). There is some
evidence in the legal press that Winston & Strawn's nonequity partners are viewed
primarily as service partners. For example, in 1993, the managing partner of Winston &
Strawn, Gary Fairchild, commented that the firm's nonequity partners "oversee
'individual engagements,' ... while equity partners are the 'principal client managers.' "
Weidlich, supra note 154. The same story reported that Winston & Strawn had no set
timetable for promotion to the equity tier. Id.
203. See Karen Dillon, Going to Extremes, AM. LAW., July-Aug. 1995, at 13 (reporting
comments of firm's managing partner, James Neis).
204. See Ann Shoket, Special Report. 1996 Midlevel Associate Survey; Chicago,
Highlights, AM. LAW., Oct. 1996, at S36.
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significant attrition at the firm .... [Winston] wants to have a New
York practice with New York hours but pay Chicago salaries. 205
Yet, by 2004, the firm's overall associate satisfaction was the second
highest among Am Law 100 firms.20 6 Its score for family friendliness
was 3.80, which was at the 75th percentile among firms in the sample.
In addition, its score for likelihood of staying at the firm for the next
two years was 4.27, which is at the 95th percentile among all firms in
the sample. Based on these statistics, it is certainly possible that the
nonequity tier may hold out substantial long-term appeal for Winston
& Strawn associates.
The partnership structure at Kirkland & Ellis presents a dramatic
contrast. Kirkland & Ellis essentially operates a two-stage up-or-out
tournament for equity partnership in which associates are eligible for
the nonequity tier after approximately six years; thereafter, the
newly-minted partners have four years to acquire the necessary skills
and track record to be promoted to equity partner.207  During the
second stage of the tournament, nonequity partners are annually
evaluated and ranked against one another, with those at the bottom
of the class typically leaving the firm.208 Those not admitted to the
equity tier at the end of the four years also generally leave the firm.20 9
Associates at Kirkland & Ellis bill an average of 51.5 hours per week
(compared to 46.7 at Winston & Strawn), which is among the highest
of any two-tier firm in the sample. 210  Not surprisingly, the firm's
family friendliness score was 2.78, which is in the bottom 5% of the
sample.
Yet, Kirkland & Ellis's two-tier structure may contain a
significant competitive advantage. Specifically, even though the firm
205. Id. (quoting anonymous Winston & Strawn associate).
206. Associate Satisfaction Leaders, AM LAW., July 2004, at 94.
207. See HEINTZ & MARKHAM-BUGBEE, supra note 8, at 25-33 (describing
characteristics of this type of two-tier firm and designating it as Model A).
208. See Frankel, supra note 12, at 92 (discussing rank and yank dynamic among
Kirkland's nonequity partners and noting the firm's management makes "no pretense that
they are true partners").
209. Carrie Johnson, The Slow Demise of 'Up or Out', N.J. L.J., Jan. 26, 1998, at 30
(quoting head of Kirkland & Ellis' recruitment committee that firm generally promotes
ten nonequity partners to the equity tier out of a typical class of fifteen to twenty and that
lawyers who fail to achieve this status after four years generally leave the firm).
210. Associates at the following single-tier firms, all based in New York City, reported
higher average billable hours per week: Sullivan & Cromwell (54.9); Cravath, Swaine &
Moore (53.6); Davis Polk & Wardwell (51.6); and Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton &
Garrison (51.6). Only Paul Weiss had lower profits per partner than Kirkland & Ellis, and
only just barely: $1,840,000 versus $1,900,000.
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has a well-known reputation for being a "sweatshop,""21 Kirkland &
Ellis's score for likelihood of staying two years (3.57) was slightly
below the median for two-tier firms (3.65) and significantly above the
median for single-tier firms (3.22). This unusual disparity may be
explained by the following observation from an associate in a large,
highly prestigious (single-tier) firm in New York City:
In my opinion having a two-tiered partnership is a great boon
to associates at top firms. Having two tiers of partnership
greatly increases the possibility that senior associates at large
firms will find a good "next stop" if they do not make it to
equity. The practice of Kirkland making almost all competent
7th years nonequity partners both keeps them at the firm
longer and retains within the firm substantial institutional
knowledge and gives the associates turned partner a
psychological boost and a huge leg up on their next job. Track
the movement of Kirkland nonequities, and you would be
shocked. If you were a CEO trying to sell the Board on a new
general counsel, what goes down easier, a "partner at
Kirkland" or an "associate at Davis Polk"?212
As this passage suggests, Kirkland & Ellis's two-tier structure
provides a potentially valuable hedging feature for associates who
make it to the nonequity tier-an attribute they are willing to pay for
through more grueling work conditions. In summary, two-tier
structures can take a variety of forms, and some systems of incentives
may be more advantageous to some firms than others.
CONCLUSION
This study provides a new empirical context to evaluate the
continued movement to the two-tier partnership structure. Drawing
upon a comprehensive dataset of Am Law 200 law firms, it
documents that single-tier firms are (a) more profitable than two-tier
firms, (b) utilize lower leverage, and (c) have higher indices of
prestige. Therefore, at first glance, the economic benefits of the two-
tier structure are not readily apparent. However, a careful
interpretation of several multivariate regression models, which
examine the determinants of law firm structure and profitability,
211. See, e.g., BROOK MOSHAN GESSER, VAULT GUIDE TO THE TOP 100 LAW FIRMS,
2005 EDITION 169, 173 (2004) (reporting on firm's reputation as the "mother of all
sweatshops").
212. Email from associate to William D. Henderson (Aug. 25, 2005) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review). The associate asked to remain anonymous.
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suggest that tier structure is largely a function of firms' relative
standing in the market for high-end corporate law services. Other
factors, such as firm size and profitability, do not appear to be
statistically relevant.
Further, the success and stability of a relatively small cohort of
elite single-tier Am Law 200 law firms is probably attributable to
three interrelated factors. First, a highly prestigious firm enjoys high
client demand for high-end, noncommodity legal services, which
enhances firm profitability. Second, the superior profitability and
prestige of these firms creates significant advantages in the
recruitment of highly talented young associates, who, in turn, are
willing to work longer hours under more grueling conditions in order
to attain the tournament prize of equity partnership. Employment at
a prestigious law firm also generates superior outplacement options,
thus permitting associates to hedge the risk of investing in firm-
specific capital. Third, the high profits per partner in these firms, in
combination with client loyalties that run primarily to the firm rather
than individual lawyers, mitigate both the incentive and the ability of
partners to grab and leave. Thus, highly prestigious firms are better
positioned to share the benefits and risks of partnership-embodied
in the single-tier partnership structure-and foster a long-term
institutional outlook, which redounds to the benefit of clients and
further solidifies the firm's reputation for superior quality and client
service.
However, the synergies of a single-tier partnership require a
critical mass of reputational capital in order to make the model self-
sustaining. Further, because client loyalties in less prestigious firms
tend to run to individual partners, the sharing ethos of a single-tier
structure can actually become a source of firm instability. In order to
diminish the possibility that a firm's most valuable rainmakers will
grab and leave, less prestigious firms must apportion profits at a level
that approximates each partner's marginal product. The adoption of
a two-tier format, therefore, can be seen as a governance structure
that bonds the firm to the marginal product approach and
consolidates managerial power within the equity tier. Although the
two-tier format is not associated with statistically significant higher
growth in PPP, firm stability arguably provides ample economic
benefit to justify the movement to a two-tier or multi-tier partnership
structure.
Finally, drawing on the multivariate regression results presented
in this study, the mixed financial performance of two-tier firms may
be partially attributable to a deleterious self-selection effect in which
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the firm attracts a disproportionate number of associates who aspire
to the less demanding role of nonequity partner. With the exception
of a handful of highly prestigious Am Law 200 firms, most law firm
managers at major corporate law firms face the daunting challenge of
needing to reward stars performing at their marginal product while
simultaneously motivating young lawyers, without the carrot of equity
partnership, to stay at .the firm and work long hours. This problem
can be solved, or mitigated, by liberal promotion to nonequity
partner. However, as the results of this study suggest, striking the
proper balance is easier said than done.
